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Appointing Plaintiff Leadership Committees and Establishing Common Benefit Funds 
 
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch 
 
To Duke MDL Judicial Conference Participants:  This session is based principally on Parts I, II.A, and 
II.B of Judging Multidistrict Litigation, which I have distributed.  I am in the midst of writing a new 
article, tentatively titled Monitoring Multidistrict Litigation: Disciplining Monopolies and Inciting Competition, 
that further develops these (and other) ideas by examining the settlements generated from the data 
described in Part II.A.2.  I will incorporate some of my recent work into this session, but would also 
be willing to discuss my findings on settlement during the session dedicated to that topic.  If there is 
interest, I would be glad to circulate the current paper once it’s finished this spring.  
 
*** 
This session considers two practices in multidistrict litigation:  appointing and compensating 
lead lawyers.  First, to avoid having to communicate with hundreds of attorneys, transferee judges 
appoint steering committees and other lead lawyers to conduct discovery, disseminate information, 
draft motions, negotiate settlements, and try bellwether cases.  Although lead attorneys control the 
litigation and wrest decision-making power away from plaintiffs’ individually retained attorneys, 
judges focus on leaders’ financing abilities, cooperative tendencies, and expertise—not adequate 
representation.  These criteria further entrench repeat players who are often settlement artists and 
may be more concerned about fostering reciprocity among fellow attorneys, pleasing judges, and 
positioning themselves for future leadership appointments than advancing plaintiffs’ heterogeneous 
interests.  
Unfortunately, conflicts aren’t exclusive to class actions.  And unlike class actions, where the 
defendant has an incentive to point out conflicts when battling class certification and again when 
ensuring the preclusive scope of any resulting settlement, the controlling stakeholders in multidistrict 
litigation—plaintiffs’ lead lawyers, defendants, and their attorneys—have little motive to raise 
conflicts.  Lead lawyers have two income sources: contingent fees from their own clients and court 
ordered “taxes” from plaintiffs who benefit from their efforts on the group’s behalf.  Accordingly, 
lead lawyers benefit from representing as many people as possible—not from recognizing divisive 
interests that might arise over different state laws, statutes of limitation, qualifying claims, insurance 
coverage, or remedial relief preferences.  And defendants’ closure hinges not on the preclusive effect 
of a class-wide settlement that demands adequate representation, but on convincing claimants to 
agree to a settlement offer.  
Second, judges compensate lead lawyers.  When lead attorneys assume work that goes well 
beyond what they would do for their own clients, they should be paid accordingly.  But judges lack a 
unified doctrinal basis for doing so.  They have borrowed piecemeal from the class action’s 
common-fund doctrine, contract principles, ethics, and equity, but ignored the corresponding 
constraints of each.  This mishmash has resulted in unpredictable outcomes, disgruntled attorneys, 
and a reduced incentive for “non-elite” lawyers to shoulder expensive, time-consuming litigation.  
Those costs are further exacerbated in some cases where judges have cut individually retained 
counsels’ contingent fee even after deducting lead-lawyer fees. 
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JUDGING MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION
ELIZABETH CHAMBLEE BURCH*
High-stakes multidistrict litigations saddle the transferee judges who manage them
with an odd juxtaposition of power and impotence. On one hand, judges appoint
and compensate lead lawyers (who effectively replace parties’ chosen counsel) and
promote settlement with scant appellate scrutiny or legislative oversight. But on the
other, without the arsenal that class certification once afforded, judges are relatively
powerless to police the private settlements they encourage. Of course, this power
shortage is of little concern since parties consent to settle.
But do they? Contrary to conventional wisdom, this Article introduces new empir-
ical data revealing that judges appoint an overwhelming number of repeat players
to leadership positions, which may complicate genuine consent through inadequate
representation. Repeat players’ financial, reputational, and reciprocity concerns can
govern their interactions with one another and opposing counsel, often trumping
fidelity to their clients. Systemic pathologies can result: dictatorial attorney hierar-
chies that fail to adequately represent the spectrum of claimants’ diverse interests,
repeat players that trade in influence to increase their fees, collusive private deals
that lack a viable monitor, and malleable procedural norms that undermine
predictability.
Current judicial practices feed these pathologies. First, when judges appoint lead
lawyers early in the litigation based on cooperative tendencies, experience, and
financial resources, they often select repeat players. But most conflicts do not arise
until discovery, and repeat players have few self-interested reasons to dissent or
derail the lucrative settlements they negotiate. Second, because steering committees
are a relatively new phenomenon and transferee judges have no formal powers
beyond those in the Federal Rules, judges have pieced together various doctrines to
justify compensating lead lawyers. The erratic fee awards that result lack coherent
limits. So, judges then permit lead lawyers to circumvent their rulings and the doc-
trinal inconsistencies by contracting with defendants to embed fee provisions in
global settlements—a well-recognized form of self-dealing. Yet, when those settle-
ments ignite concern, judges lack the formal tools to review them.
These pathologies need not persist. Appointing cognitively diverse attorneys who
represent heterogeneous clients, permitting third-party financing, encouraging
objections and dissent from non-lead counsel, and selecting permanent leadership
after conflicts develop can expand the pool of qualified applicants and promote
adequate representation. Compensating these lead lawyers on a quantum-meruit
* Copyright © 2015 by Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Associate Professor, University of
Georgia School of Law. My thanks to Thomas Burch, Brannon Denning, Howard
Erichson, Myriam Gilles, Timothy Holbrook, Samuel Issacharoff, David Marcus, Teddy
Rave, Peter “Bo” Rutledge, Charles Silver, Judge Jack B. Weinstein, Margaret Williams,
Anonymous Transferee Judge, Anonymous Circuit Court Judge, and participants at the
joint Emory/UGA faculty workshop, and the University of Georgia’s faculty speaker series
for their insights on earlier drafts. No views or claims in this Article should be attributed to
any of these outstanding individuals; they belong solely to the author. Many thanks also to
Melissa Conrad-Alam, Ellen Clarke, David Ehrlich, David McGee, and Savanna Nolan for
their research and data collection assistance, and to the editors at the New York University
Law Review for their valuable editorial assistance.
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basis could then smooth doctrinal inconsistencies, align these fee awards with other
attorneys’ fees, and impose dependable outer limits. Finally, because quantum
meruit demands that judges assess the benefit lead lawyers conferred on the plain-
tiffs and the results they achieved, it equips judges with a private-law basis for
assessing nonclass settlements and harnesses their review to a very powerful incen-
tive: attorneys’ fees.
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INTRODUCTION
Multidistrict litigation often involves billion-dollar lawsuits
steeped in media attention, such as litigation over asbestos, Apple’s
iPhone, the BP oil spill, Vioxx, Facebook’s internet tracking, Google’s
Street View service, Chinese-manufactured drywall, and Toyota’s
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acceleration problems, to name but a few.1 Yet, the transferee judges
who use innovative procedures to usher these cases toward settlement
are rarely subject to appellate scrutiny or legislative oversight.2 And
while multidistrict litigation is ostensibly for pretrial purposes only, in
practice, as the old song goes, “when you leave that way, you can
never go back.”3 In fact, transferee judges have remanded a scant
2.9% of cases to their original districts.4
Three practices in particular raise concerns about how judicial
power affects adequate representation, doctrinal consistency, predict-
ability, public perception, and plaintiffs’ attorneys’ incentives to
shoulder expensive and time-consuming litigation. First, transferee
judges create hierarchies of influence. To streamline cases and avoid
having to communicate with hundreds of attorneys, judges appoint
steering committees and other lead lawyers to conduct discovery, dis-
seminate information, draft motions, negotiate settlements, and try
bellwether cases. Yet, they rarely explain why they choose particular
attorneys and may even handpick counsel with few or no involved
clients. Although lead attorneys control the litigation and wrest
decision-making power away from plaintiffs’ individually retained
counsel,5 judges focus on lead lawyers’ financing abilities, cooperative
tendencies, and expertise—not adequate representation. These cri-
1 E.g., Alex Berenson, Merck Is Said to Agree to Pay $4.85 Billion for Vioxx Claims,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2007, at A1; Kirk Johnson, Asbestos Prosecution Results in Acquittals,
N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2009, at A10; Andrew Martin, Turning Point for Suits over Chinese
Drywall, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2012, at B1; John Schwartz, Accord Reached Settling Lawsuit
over BP Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2012, at A1; Bill Vlasic, Toyota Agrees to Deal in
Suit over Speedups, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2012, at A1; Kit Chellel & Jeremy Hodges,
Facebook Suit over Subscriber Tracking Seeks $15 Billion, BLOOMBERG (May 19, 2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-18/facebook-sued-for-15-billion-in-suit-over-
user-tracking.html; Court Stays Litigation in Google Street View Case, BLOOMBERG BNA
(July 20, 2011), http://www.bna.com/court-stays-litigation-in-google-street-view-case-
certifies-for-interlocutory-appeal-its-prior-order-ruling-that-interception-of-open-wifi-
data-violates-the-wiretap-act/.
2 See infra notes 57–61 and accompanying text (describing the lack of appellate
scrutiny and legislative oversight).
3 CONFEDERATE RAILROAD, When You Leave That Way You Can Never Go Back, on
CONFEDERATE RAILROAD (Atlantic 1992); SAM NEELY, WHEN YOU LEAVE THAT WAY
YOU CAN NEVER GO BACK (MCA Records 1983).
4 Since its creation in 1968, the Panel has centralized 462,501 civil actions for pretrial
proceedings. By the end of 2013, 13,432 actions had been remanded for trial, 398 had been
reassigned within the transferee districts, 359,548 had been terminated in the transferee
courts, and 89,123 were pending throughout the district courts. Judicial Business 2013:
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. COURTS (2013), http://
www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2013/judicial-panel-multidistrict-
litigation.aspx.
5 This Article focuses on litigation in which collective action problems exist principally
among plaintiffs’ counsel, but in some litigation, such as intellectual-property litigation, the
collective action problem may exist primarily among defense counsel. Many of the
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teria further entrench repeat players, who are often settlement artists
and may be more concerned about pleasing judges, fostering reci-
procity among fellow attorneys, and positioning themselves for future
appointments than advancing plaintiffs’ heterogeneous interests.
Second, judges compensate lead lawyers. When lead attorneys
assume work that goes well beyond what they would do for their own
clients, they should be paid accordingly. But judges lack a unified doc-
trinal basis for doing so. They have borrowed piecemeal from class
actions’ common-fund doctrine, contract principles, ethics, and equity
while ignoring the corresponding constraints of each. This mishmash
has resulted in unpredictable outcomes, disgruntled attorneys, and a
reduced incentive for “non-elite” lawyers to shoulder expensive, time-
consuming litigation. Those costs are further exacerbated in cases
where judges have cut individually retained counsel’s contingent fees
even after deducting lead-lawyer fees.6
Third, judges have presided over private settlements without a
legal basis. They cite public-policy concerns or analogize multidistrict
litigation to class actions, but most multidistrict cases are not certified
as classes.7 Unlike class actions, in which Rule 23(e) demands a
searching judicial inquiry into whether the settlement is fair, reason-
able, and adequate, nonclass settlements are private contracts. Thus,
by one view, unless the settlement itself authorizes the court to act,8
these judges overstepped their power and paternalistically meddled
with plaintiffs’ ability to contract with defendants.9 Others advocate
extending the dubious “quasi-class action” moniker to allow judges to
monitor nonclass settlements as they do class actions.10 But both views
miss the mark. The first ignores attorneys’ temptation to cross ethical
boundaries to achieve finality and pretends that plaintiffs have con-
ventional, one-on-one attorney-client relationships that allow them to
monitor their own suits. This is plainly not the case when lawyers
arguments that I set forth will apply with equal force to the defense side in intellectual-
property litigation.
6 See infra notes 193–223 and accompanying text (reviewing the controversial judicial
practice of capping private contingent-fee contracts).
7 See infra notes 20–26 and accompanying text (describing the decline of class
certification).
8 See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 552–53 & n.7 (E.D. La.
2009) (discussing the Vioxx Settlement Agreement and its authorizations to the court).
9 See, e.g., Jeremy T. Grabill, Judicial Review of Private Mass Tort Settlements, 42
SETON HALL L. REV. 123, 126–27 (2012) (arguing that courts should not have authority to
review nonclass aggregate settlements); Linda S. Mullenix, Dubious Doctrines: The Quasi-
Class Action, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 389 (2011) (criticizing the use of “quasi-class actions”).
10 See Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV.
469, 529 (1994) (arguing that consolidations should be treated for some purposes as class
actions).
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represent thousands of clients in the same litigation. Yet, the second
view allows litigants and the judiciary to end-run Rule 23, strip away
its due-process protections, and use it as a grab bag from which they
can select helpful provisions while ignoring those that impede
finality.11
As class certification dwindles and courts rely increasingly on
multidistrict litigation to resolve aggregate litigation, much work
remains to be done on how we understand and theorize these prac-
tices. Although a few commentators have begun to recognize multi-
district litigation’s significance, they tend to focus on single issues
without evaluating the spillover effects.12 By considering judicial prac-
tices holistically, this Article aims to present a unified theory of judi-
cial power—and its limits.
By turning a critical lens on judicial power, this Article makes
three principal contributions. First, it presents the first empirical look
into the number of repeat players that transferee judges appoint to
leadership positions. As such, it offers data to support persistent anec-
dotes about repeat play and suggests a reality in which plaintiffs’
attorneys favor reciprocity, reputation, and cooperation over ade-
quate representation and dissent in order to secure positions as lead
lawyers. Given the due-process concerns and group decision-making
biases that arise when dissent is absent or salutary, judges should bal-
ance leadership committees to capture the benefits of outside perspec-
tives and dissenters. Second, judges can compensate lead lawyers on a
coherent and more predictable basis by distilling current theories
down to their common denominator: quantum meruit. Quantum-
meruit awards would align fees with other attorney-fee decisions and
compensate leaders based on the value they actually add. Third,
employing a quantum-meruit theory for fees would give judges a
private-law basis for scrutinizing settlements. Because courts must
evaluate the case’s success to determine how much compensation is
merited, it would likewise help stymie a trend toward self-dealing
where repeat players insert fee provisions into master settlements and
11 See Mullenix, supra note 9, at 394 (describing a case in which the court resisted
plaintiffs’ attempt to circumvent class-action rules); see also Vaz v. Allstate Prop. & Cas.
Ins. Co., No 1:06cv481-LTS-RHW, slip op. at 2 (S.D. Miss. Oct 25, 2006) (observing that it
would be “inconsistent” to “deny class certification . . . and at the same time allow [claims]
to go forward in what the Magistrate accurately described as a ‘quasi-class action
lawsuit . . . without regard for the rigid requirements for class certification’”).
12 See, e.g., Grabill, supra note 9, at 126–27 (discussing judicial roles in private mass-
tort settlements); Alexandra N. Rothman, Note, Bringing an End to the Trend: Cutting
Judicial “Approval” and “Rejection” Out of Non-Class Mass Settlement, 80 FORDHAM L.
REV. 319 (2011) (discussing judicial approval and rejection of nonclass mass settlements).
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require plaintiffs and their attorneys to “consent” to fee increases to
obtain settlement awards.
These proposals differ substantially from one set forth by
Professors Silver and Miller, who recommend adapting the lead-plain-
tiff process in securities class actions to fit multidistrict litigation.13
Specifically, Silver and Miller suggest judges appoint a plaintiffs’ man-
agement committee comprised of attorneys with the largest client
inventory and that those attorneys then pick, compensate, and mon-
itor the lawyers performing the common-benefit work.14 While there
is value in seeking an objective measure such as client inventory, in
reality, this rewards lawyers who purchase the largest number of
undifferentiated clients from referral lawyers, motivates counsel to
collect clients with weaker claims, empowers repeat players,15 and fur-
ther encourages attorneys to value reciprocity, reputation, and coop-
eration over adequate client representation. Although market-based
solutions remain a viable option (particularly if implemented through
a well-informed third-party financier),16 this Article focuses on
improving representation and predictability in decision making and
thus depends on a knowledgeable, neutral third party: the judge.
Part I sketches the host of concerns animating judicial decisions
and incentives in multidistrict litigation such as the need to thwart
self-dealing and manage agency problems between attorneys and their
clients, prevent collusion, organize lawyers, and strike a delicate bal-
ance between too much and not enough judicial oversight. In many
ways, certifying a class under Rule 23 simplified this balancing act by
equipping judges with explicit authority to intervene. Yet, many of the
abuses that Rule 23 was designed to address tend to flourish in its
absence. These abuses, both real and potential, prompt conscientious
judges to push the limits of their authority to discourage coercive, col-
lusive, or unfair settlements. But institutional pressure, with its steady
drumbeat of settlement, complicates their task by layering judicial and
systemic efficiency interests atop parties’ interests.
13 See Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of
Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107,
159–77 (2010) (discussing the adoption of the lead-plaintiff process and its advantages).
14 Id. at 159–75.
15 Having repeat players on key committees is not an inherently negative scenario.
Rather, it is the tit-for-tat reciprocity and lingering reputational concerns that suggest
repeat players may sell out a segment of the group when it furthers repeat players’ self-
interest. Likewise, there is a separate concern that many repeat players are appointed for
their expertise as settlement artists, and not because they are the best litigators.
16 I have put forth a proposal along these lines in the past. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch,
Financiers as Monitors in Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1315–38 (2012).
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Part II critiques the exercise of judicial power using extralegal
insights from social psychology as well as conventional due process.
Part II.A explains that when judges emphasize expertise, cooperation,
and financial resources, they tend to appoint repeat players and culti-
vate an environment in which attorneys must put their self-interest
and reputation above representing clients with divergent interests. To
support this proposition, this Part introduces empirical evidence on
repeat players in leadership roles. As long hypothesized, although less
than half of the law firms involved in product-liability multidistrict liti-
gations are repeat players, attorneys from those firms filled over 78%
of all leadership positions.17
Moving beyond their appointment, Part II.B critiques the piece-
meal doctrinal theories used to compensate lead lawyers—class-action
law’s common-fund doctrine, contract principles, ethics, and equity.
None of these theories fully explain judicial decisions, which leads to
unpredictable fee awards. And these circumstances make it nearly
impossible for dissenting attorneys to identify a doctrinal toehold for
their objections. Part II.C extends these concerns over predictability
and limits on judicial power to settlements and suggests that judges’
current justifications for “approving” private, nonclass settlements
suffer from similar shortcomings.
Part III identifies regulatory and doctrinal solutions to Part II’s
concerns. First, it proposes alternative criteria and procedures for
appointing lead lawyers and expanding the pool of eligible candidates.
For example, encouraging input and dissent from non-lead lawyers
promotes adequate representation, and permitting qualified attorneys
to rely on third-party financing to fund common-benefit work expands
the number of viable candidates. Second, it suggests that employing a
quantum-meruit theory to compensate lead lawyers would align those
decisions with fee awards more generally, impose predictable limits,
and curtail the practice of uniformly reducing non-lead attorneys’ con-
tingent fees. Finally, because using a quantum-meruit theory requires
judges to assess the benefit that leaders conferred and the results they
obtained for the plaintiffs, it supplies a valid basis for assessing private
settlements. Although this authority is limited and thus not a gateway
to the kind of wholesale settlement review that Rule 23(e) would
countenance, it does furnish judges with enhanced policing authority
tied to a consequential incentive: attorneys’ fees.
17 See infra notes 114–26 and accompanying text for additional information and
qualifiers.
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I
MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION MINUS CLASS CERTIFICATION
Transferee judges face a Herculean task. Coordinating hundreds
or thousands of nominally similar cases entails managing countless
intrinsic human elements—attorneys’ egos, injured plaintiffs, defen-
dants with public-relations problems and fickle shareholders, not to
mention greed, reputational concerns, and personal animosity. Section
1407 captures none of this when it authorizes the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation (“the Panel”) to oversee all federal dockets
and transfer cases with a common question of fact to a single federal
judge for coordinated pretrial handling.18 The first hint that coordina-
tion requires more than strict deadlines comes when the Panel forgoes
parties’ geographic convenience in favor of an experienced transferee
judge.19 While past experience helps ensure judicial competence, it
also means that transferee judges may be repeat players who
approach new litigation with their own assumptions, prejudices, and
preferences.
A. Transferee Judges’ Evolving Role
Transferee judges’ experiences and preferences are increasingly
constrained by changing procedural options, chiefly the gradual
decline of class certification. Since the mid-1990s, Congress and the
appellate courts have made it harder to certify a class by requiring
plaintiffs to prove Rule 23’s prerequisites by a preponderance of the
evidence,20 instructing judges to delve into a case’s merits when the
merits overlap with class-certification requirements,21 and compli-
cating choice-of-law questions and manageability by providing federal
courts with jurisdiction.22 As researchers at the Federal Judicial
18 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012).
19 See John G. Heyburn II, A View from the Panel: Part of the Solution, 82 TULANE L.
REV. 2225, 2240 (2008) (describing the Panel’s ideal transferee judge).
20 E.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 307 (3d Cir. 2008);
Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2007); In re
IPO Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 37 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc.,
249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating that a district court judge must receive evidence
and resolve disputes before deciding whether to certify a class).
21 E.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 307; Oscar, 487 F.3d at 268; In re IPO
Sec., 471 F.3d at 41; Szabo, 249 F.3d at 676; see also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.06 (2010) (stating that if the court must resolve a substantive
question to determine suitability for class-action treatment, the court should do so). More
recently, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes strengthened the commonality standard under
Rule 23(a) and ensured that defendants could raise individual defenses, which could
prevent Rule 23(b)(3) certification. 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558–61 (2011).
22 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) § 2(a)–(b), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4,
5 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1711 note (2012)). Of course, one might say that because CAFA
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Center found, the number of personal-injury and product-liability
cases consolidated through multidistrict litigation has increased, while
the number of class-certification motions has decreased, which “sug-
gest[s] a declining rate of class certification.”23 Yet, certification
offered transferee judges a dizzying array of judicial powers to
appoint class counsel,24 ensure a fair settlement,25 and award fees,26
all of which helped prevent counsel from exploiting absent class
members.
Waning class certification contributed to two developments. First,
it forced multidistrict litigation to become the primary means for
resolving aggregate litigation.27 Yet, Congress never envisioned trans-
feree judges concluding multidistrict cases; the plan was simply to
streamline the discovery and pretrial process and then return cases to
their home districts for trial.28 Thus, nothing in § 1407 confers any
additional authority beyond what is available through the ordinary
Federal Rules. This leads to the second development: Transferee
judges have had to adapt to ambiguous authority despite lingering
concerns over collusion, contingent fees, and attorney overreaching.
So, as experienced transferee judges struggle to police the same self-
interested behavior they witnessed in class-action practice, they find
themselves without the tools that Rule 23 provided.
B. Judicial Misgivings over Attorney Conduct
Collusive circumstances in class actions initially forced judges
into uncharted territory: No longer were they acting as neutral arbi-
ters, but as inquisitors.29 When both parties become “friends” of the
deal and ask the court to approve and enforce a settlement class,
tends to inhibit class certification due to choice-of-law questions, the choice-of-law issues
are actually much easier because they simply disappear once class certification is denied.
23 Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict
Consolidations: Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 KAN. L. REV. 775, 777
(2010).
24 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g).
25 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
26 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) & advisory committee’s note to 2003 amendment.
27 To be clear, multidistrict litigation (MDL) has always played a substantial role in
products-liability litigation, where individual issues tend to predominate over common
ones, but less of a role in other areas that often proceeded as class actions like securities or
antitrust.
28 See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 40 (1998)
(quoting legislative history); see also L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Unsettling Efficiency: When
Non-Class Aggregation of Mass Torts Creates Second-Class Settlements, 65 LA. L. REV.
157, 196–97 (2004) (describing Congress’s emphasis on expediency).
29 See Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice, 87 GEO. L. J.
1983, 2002–03 (1999) (arguing that in mass-tort litigation judges must make searching
inquiries into the fairness and adequacy of representation of a settlement).
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judges can no longer depend on the adversarial system.30 But just as
they adapted to this new culture by assuming the mantle of a “mana-
gerial”31 judge or even a “deal-broker,”32 aggregate litigation changed
again with the class action’s gradual decline.33 Nevertheless, defen-
dants’ desires have remained static: They want a global resolution that
provides them with finality and closure.
So, even though class certification has decreased, experiments
with ethically questionable means for achieving finality have not. Con-
flicts between attorneys and their clients and among the clients them-
selves continue to materialize. Plaintiffs’ firms might have tacit
agreements or fee-sharing arrangements with one another that further
their collective self-interest and tether their financial interests to each
other instead of to each client’s outcome.34 Competing interests,
attorney funding, and contingent fees can lead to quick or collusive
settlements, underfunded litigation, exorbitant attorneys’ fees, coer-
cive settlement terms, and misallocated settlement proceeds.35 For
example, in Johnson v. Nextel Communications, Inc.,36 a group of cli-
ents hired a law firm to sue Nextel for employment discrimination, but
the firm made a deal with the defendant that would give plaintiffs’
lawyers kickbacks in exchange for convincing their clients to abandon
their legal claims.37
Although judges often act carefully to stymie attorney abuses like
these, they can also facilitate overreaching by approving new forms of
self-dealing where lead lawyers use their bargaining position to
increase their fees. For instance, in the Guidant litigation, Judge Frank
initially issued a fee-transfer form that required participating plaintiffs
and their counsel to allocate 2% of a plaintiff’s gross monetary
30 Howard M. Erichson, The Problem of Settlement Class Actions, 82 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 951, 953 (2014).
31 See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 378 (1982) (describing
judges who see their task as case management).
32 See William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J.
371, 373 (2001) (discussing judges’ vested interest in transactions that create finality).
33 See Willging & Lee, supra note 23, at 777 (describing a decrease in class-certification
motions); see also Jack B. Weinstein, Comments on Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement
(1984), 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1269 (2009) (“Rather than considering corrective
action to prevent overreaching by the plaintiffs’ bar, the courts used [asbestos] cases as a
basis for almost destroying the class action . . . .”).
34 E.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 221–22 (2d Cir. 1987).
35 See Weinstein, supra note 10, at 525, 527–30 (1994) (“If counsel is without financial
resources to handle litigation, he or she may feel pressured to settle some cases quickly to
finance the litigation—to prime the pump, so to speak.”); Adam S. Zimmerman,
Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500, 512–14 (2011) (noting the principal-agent
problems that pervade class settlements).
36 660 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2011).
37 Id. at 135, 139.
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recovery to compensate lead lawyers and 2% for litigation costs.38
Apparently unhappy with this compensation but not wanting to rob
their fee award of its aura of contractual consent, the plaintiffs’
steering committee negotiated its fees with the defendant. As a result,
the Master Settlement Agreement permitted the steering committee
to apply for fees, which plaintiffs and their attorneys “consented” to
by accepting the deal.39 Of course, controlling lead lawyers’ compen-
sation is a powerful bargaining chip that defendants do not give up
freely, but exchange for things like lower settlement amounts, higher
participation rates, and other beneficial provisions.40 Despite the
structural collusion and the lack of clear notice to plaintiffs and their
attorneys, Judge Frank read the settlement as “contract[ing] around”
his initial order and upped lead lawyers’ fees substantially, from 2% to
14.4%—an extra $29.7 million.41
Lead lawyers’ fee success in Guidant kick-started a disturbing
trend of permitting lead lawyers to negotiate with defendants to
include their fees in settlements. The Vioxx settlement followed
closely on the heels of the Guidant settlement and, like Guidant, con-
tracted around Judge Fallon’s 3% fee cap, raising the cap to 8% and
deducting the entire amount from individual attorneys’ contingent
fees.42 Similarly, in the Genetically Modified Rice Litigation, Judge
Perry ruled that she lacked jurisdiction to order state-court litigants to
withhold and contribute 11% of plaintiffs’ gross settlement recovery
to a common fund that would compensate and reimburse lead law-
yers.43 Yet, the settlement agreement required all enrolling claimants
(whether litigating in state or federal court) to contribute that amount
to the common fund even though federal litigants surely benefitted
more from lead attorneys’ discovery efforts than did state-court
plaintiffs.44
38 In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-
1708, 2008 WL 682174, at *2 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008). The Guidant litigation involved
claims by plaintiffs stemming from alleged defects in implantable defibrillator devices and
pacemakers that Guidant manufactured.
39 In re Guidant, 2008 WL 682174, at *2–4, *13.
40 Silver & Miller, supra note 13, at 134.
41 In re Guidant, 2008 WL 682174, at *2–4, *12, *15–16; see also Silver & Miller, supra
note 13, at 109 (describing how judges have historically awarded lead attorneys high fees).
42 Lawyers settled the Guidant litigation on July 12, 2007, and the Vioxx litigation on
November 9, 2007. The respective judges involved issued their corresponding opinions
about six months apart. In re Guidant, 2008 WL 682174, at *3; In re Vioxx Prods. Liab.
Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606 (E.D. La. 2008).
43 In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., No. 4:06 MD 1811 CDP, 2010 WL 716190, at
*1–3 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 24, 2010).
44 MDL Settlement Agreement § 8.1.1–.2, In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., No.
4:06 MD 1811 (CDP) (July 2011), available at http://www.gmricesettlement.com/BY_
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Repeat players influence on this trend is readily apparent. Three
of the four lead lawyers in Guidant were also appointed to leadership
positions in Vioxx,45 and one lead attorney in both of those litigations
was also a lead lawyer in the Genetically Modified Rice Litigation.46
To be clear, the trouble isn’t with compensating lead lawyers who may
benefit other attorneys and their clients, but in allowing those in
power to negotiate their fee with the defendant—a classic form of
structural collusion and breach of their fiduciary obligations.47
The Vioxx litigation was plagued with other ethical questions,
too. For example, the settlement “offer” was actually a contract
between the plaintiffs’ attorneys and Merck, which required each par-
ticipating attorney to recommend the settlement to 100% of her eli-
gible clients and to withdraw from representing any who refused.48 If
fewer than 85% of claimants consented, Merck could withdraw its
offer and no one—plaintiffs’ attorneys included—would receive any
money. The settlement also named Judge Fallon, who presided over
the federal multidistrict litigation, as its “chief administrator,” a posi-
OfficialSettlement.aspx. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed. In re Genetically
Modified Rice Litig., 764 F. 3d 864 (8th Cir. 2014).
45 The Lead Counsel Committee in Guidant included Richard Arsnault, Elizabeth
Cabraser, Seth Lesser, and Charles Zimmerman. In re Guidant Corp. Implantable
Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2005) (Pretrial
Order No. 1 (Designation of Plaintiffs’ Lead, Liaison Counsel, and Defendants’ Lead and
Liaison Counsel)). Richard Arsenault and Elizabeth Cabraser were two of the eleven
people appointed to the Vioxx Plaintiff Steering Committee. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab.
Litig., MDL No. 1657 (E.D. La. Apr. 8, 2005) (Pretrial Order No. 6). Seth Lesser was
appointed to the Government Actions Plaintiffs’ Case Management Committee. In re
Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657 (E.D. La. July 9, 2009) (Pretrial Order No. 44).
46 Richard Arsenault was also a lead attorney in the Genetically Modified Rice
Litigation. In re LLRice 601 Contamination Litig., MDL No. 4:06 MD 1811 CDP (E.D.
Mo. Apr. 18, 2007) (Order Appointing Leadership Counsel). Stephen Weiss, who was also
named a lead attorney in the Genetically Modified Rice Litigation, is a partner of Chris
Seeger, who was a lead attorney in Vioxx.
47 See John C. Coffee Jr., Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on Reform, 62
IND. L.J. 625, 647–48 (1987) (“While no honest defendant’s attorney would offer to
exchange a low settlement for a high fee award (nor would a responsible plaintiff’s
attorney accept such an offer, if made), neither has to offer any such ‘bribe,’ because the
legal rules applicable to class actions essentially do it for them.”); Charles Silver, The
Responsibilities of Lead Lawyers and Judges in Multidistrict Litigations, 79 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1985, 1990 (2011) (arguing that lead attorneys are fiduciaries to all the plaintiffs). In
fairness, as Part II.B.1 explains in depth, no coherent rationale currently explains lead
lawyers’ fee awards, so attorneys are attempting to contract around this uncertainty.
48 Settlement Agreement § 1.2.8.1–.2, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657
(E.D. La. Nov. 9, 2007), available at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/vioxx/. For the many
ways in which this agreement arguably ran afoul of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, see Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96
CORNELL L. REV. 265, 279–92 (2011).
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tion that nonsettling plaintiffs claimed made him appear partial.49 Dis-
gruntled plaintiffs cited language from one of Judge Fallon’s orders,
which required nonsettling plaintiffs to appear in courts around the
country “to ensure that plaintiffs who are eligible for the Vioxx settle-
ment program but who have not enrolled in the program have all nec-
essary information available to them so they can make informed
choices.”50 Yet, plaintiffs had private counsel who had presumably
already explained the deal to them. So, objectors argued that the
order had a pejorative quality to it. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit
rejected both the argument that the settlement’s terms coerced plain-
tiffs’ consent51 and the contention that Judge Fallon’s dual roles cre-
ated conflicts demanding recusal.52
All of these examples—Vioxx, Guidant, and Genetically Modified
Rice—highlight concerns that arise during settlement. Nevertheless,
transferee judges encourage settlement. First, Rule 16 expressly
authorizes judges to facilitate settlement discussions before trial, and
as pretrial judges, transferee judges would be remiss not to prompt
these conversations.53 Second, as Judge Weinstein has observed, “Fed-
eral judges tend to be biased toward settlement.”54 Finally, the Panel
49 Appellants’ Brief, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 388 F. App’x 391 (5th Cir. 2010)
(No. 09-30446), 2009 WL 7111920, at *23; see Jef Feeley & Leslie Snadowsky, Merck Vioxx
Judge Threatens to End Suit Consolidation, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 5, 2006), http://www.
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=21070001&sid=aOUXOdXoKAX8 (discussing Judge
Fallon’s role in the Vioxx settlements); see also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R.
2.6 & cmt. (2008) (stating that judges must be careful that efforts to further settlement do
not undermine parties’ right to be heard); Mark A. Peterson & Molly Selvin, Mass Justice:
The Limited and Unlimited Power of the Courts, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227, 230
(1991) (“Faced with mass tort litigation, judges are not simply neutral arbiters; rather, they
have strong personal incentives to speed the judicial process, save costs and labor, and
reduce redundancy.”); Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The
Agent Orange Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 337, 361–62 (1986) (describing how judges who
make enormous investments in a settlement are unlikely to remain indifferent to its
outcome); Weinstein, supra note 10, at 521 (“Even though bulk settlements may
technically violate ethical rules, judges often encourage their acceptance to terminate a
large number of cases.”).
50 Appellants’ Brief, supra note 49, at *13 (citation omitted).
51 In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 412 F. App’x. 653, 653–54 (5th Cir. 2010). But cf. In re
Gen. Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1133–34 (7th Cir. 1979)
(“The subclass member is presented with an accept-or-else situation: if he does not accept,
his federal claim is lost even though he cannot receive the benefits of the settlement
package. . . . [T]he dismissal of the action is fundamentally unfair to nonconsenting
subclass members . . . .”).
52 In re Vioxx, 388 F. App’x at 395–97.
53 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(5).
54 Weinstein, supra note 33, at 1265; see also In re Nineteen Appeals Arising out of the
San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 982 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir. 1992) (observing that
the Panel consolidated cases in front of Judge Acosta, but “[s]hortly thereafter, the Chief
Justice appointed the Honorable Louis C. Bechtle as a ‘settlement judge,’” such that while
Judge Acosta advanced the litigation toward trial, “Judge Bechtle endeavored to advance
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views quickly settling a complex case as a hallmark of success that
disposes it to reward that judge with new litigation.55 Multidistrict liti-
gations are plum judicial assignments; they involve interesting facts,
media attention, and some of the nation’s most talented attorneys. So,
even though conflicting interests, misaligned incentives, and attorney
overreaching crop up most prominently during settlement, judges
have their own incentives to broker deals.
II
THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL POWER AND
INHERENT AUTHORITY
Despite facing a task of mythic proportions, transferee judges
possess no more power than their mortal counterparts. Yet, the need
for settlement, judicial misgivings about attorney misconduct and free
riding, and the lack of Rule 23’s explicit policing power persist—so
judges innovate. They have stretched basic common-law doctrines like
their “inherent judicial authority” to fill the regulatory void. And
while judges’ intentions in implementing these creative solutions are
exemplary, these measures have downsides too.
Three practices, in particular, warrant scrutiny. First, in
appointing attorneys to leadership positions, judges focus on experi-
ence, cooperative tendencies, and an ability to finance the litigation—
factors that favor repeat players, as evidenced by their filling over
63% of all leadership positions.56 Emphasizing these traits can have
detrimental effects like group decision-making biases and fear of dis-
senting. Second, when judges invoke a variety of legal doctrines, anal-
ogies, and their inherent judicial authority to compensate lead
lawyers, their decisions can be unpredictable and difficult to chal-
settlement prospects by determining individual and aggregate values for the cases”);
Richard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of Dispersed Litigation? Toward a Maximalist Use
of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel’s Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2245, 2288–89 (2008)
(discussing settlement bias in multidistrict litigation).
55 This observation is based principally on conversations I have had with federal judges
and their clerks, as well as on the general perception that judges who receive these cases
are especially capable and that such assignments are accompanied by publicity and
prestige. See David F. Herr & Nicole Narotzky, The Judicial Panel’s Role in Managing
Mass Litigation, SN066 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 249, 299 (2008) (“The Panel undoubtedly considers
the ability and reputation of a judge in determining whether to assign complex,
multidistrict litigation . . . . [The Panel] expressly identified former Panel membership, as
well as leadership roles in various federal court committees as a reason for selecting Chief
Judge Sam Pointer as a transferee judge.”); Susan Willett Bird, Note, The Assignment of
Cases to Federal District Court Judges, 27 STAN. L. REV. 475, 483 n.42 (1975) (reporting
that related cases were “assigned specifically to Judge X . . . because he was ‘especially
able’”).
56 See infra notes 114–26 and accompanying text for additional information and
qualifiers.
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lenge. Finally, judges who publicly approve or disapprove private set-
tlements have not identified explicit authority that allows private
parties to predict when judicial interference will occur or the bounda-
ries for such conduct.
Despite attorney dissatisfaction with these decisions, several fac-
tors inoculate them from thorough appellate review.57 First, because
most multidistrict litigations result in private settlements, they are not
reviewable on appeal, even when subject to public judicial commen-
tary. Second, because most interim rulings are not dispositive orders,
they are reviewable only through an extraordinary writ of mandamus
or subsequent dismissal.58 Motions to disqualify a lead attorney, for
example, are not immediately appealable as a matter of right even
though an attorney could theoretically petition for mandamus.59
Third, even if the appellate court grants mandamus or reviews a dis-
missed case, it tends to do so using the highly deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard.60 Vague initial standards, subjective decisions
about which attorney would best serve the plaintiffs, and the lack of
precedent make this standard a formidable hurdle. Fourth, practical
incentives counsel against objecting, at least with regard to lead-
57 See Carolyn A. Dubay, Trends and Problems in the Appointment and Compensation
of Common Benefit Counsel in Complex Multi-District Litigation: An Empirical Study of
Ten Mega MDLs 13 (Oct. 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the New York
University Law Review) (“Discerning the practices of each MDL court with respect to
common benefit counsel is daunting for a number of reasons. Decisions are rarely
published, rarely appealed, and oftentimes records relating to fees are filed under seal.”);
Silver & Miller, supra note 13, at 109, 119 (“[Judges] face no known risk of appellate
review or reversal: no appointment decision seems ever to have been challenged, much less
reversed.”).
58 Transferee judges tend to issue Lone Pine orders after most plaintiffs’ cases are
resolved through a comprehensive settlement. These orders require nonsettling claimants
to submit specific proof regarding their injuries to avoid dismissal. Lore v. Lone Pine
Corp., No. L-33606-85, 1986 WL 637507, at *3–4 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 18, 1986);
see also, e.g., Acuna v. Brown & Root Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 340–41 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding
that the district court’s prediscovery Lone Pine orders were not abuses of its discretion).
59 See Cunningham v. Hamilton Cnty., Ohio, 527 U.S. 198, 207 (1999) (finding that the
decision to appeal should turn on clients’ interests alone); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 370 (1981) (holding that orders denying motions to disqualify
counsel are not appealable final decisions).
60 See In re Dresser Indus., Inc., 972 F.2d 540, 542–43 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding
mandamus appropriate only when a trial court has indisputably abused its discretion).
Dismissals under Rule 16(f) are reviewed using the abuse-of-discretion standard. Nat’l
Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642 (1976) (per curiam) (“The
question, of course, is not whether this Court, or whether the Court of Appeals, would as
an original matter have dismissed the action; it is whether the District Court abused its
discretion in so doing.”); e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 388 F. App’x 391, 395–96 (5th
Cir. 2010) (using the abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing the allegation that Judge
Fallon should have recused himself based on his dual roles as judge and chief administrator
of the Master Settlement Agreement).
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lawyer selections. An objecting attorney faces the risk that her peers
will dub her non-cooperative and thus “ineligible” for future leader-
ship roles. Plus, early objections could alienate dissenters from both
the chosen leaders and the transferee judge, making them less effec-
tive advocates.61 Consequently, if change is to be had, transferee
judges must initiate it.
A. Appointing Lead Lawyers
Current judicial practice in selecting attorney leadership, where
courts stress expertise, cooperative abilities, and financial means, can
raise several concerns. First, valuing cooperation may encourage
attorneys to be more concerned with impressing judges or their peers
than vigorously representing clients whose interests differ from the
majority’s.62 Second, cooperation fosters a need for attorneys to curry
favor with one another, which, when combined with the prevalence of
repeat players,63 can infect leadership committees with well-
documented group decision-making biases, like conformity.64 Third,
appointing only repeat players may create groups of homogeneous
thinkers who are less innovative.65 Thus, focusing on experience and
cooperation may cut against the notion that “diversity trumps ability”
in disjunctive tasks like identifying and cultivating successful legal
arguments.66
61 See Silver & Miller, supra note 13, at 119.
62 This can cause a cascade effect that prompts them to discount contrary information.
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 55–59, 74 (2003) (“In a
reputational cascade, people think that they know what is right . . . but they nonetheless go
along with the crowd in order to maintain the good opinion of others. Even the most
confident people sometimes fall prey to this, silencing themselves in the process.”).
63 See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the prevalence of and potential problems with
appointing repeat players to leadership positions).
64 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 62, at 62 (“Cascade effects and blunders are significantly
increased if people are rewarded not for correct decisions but for decisions that conform to
the decisions made by most people. . . . Such a system of rewards is likely to lead both
individual and groups in bad directions.”).
65 See SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES
BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES xvii (1st paperback prtg. 2008) (arguing
that cognitive diversity enables novel breakthroughs).
66 See id. at xiv–xv (“[D]isjunctive tasks [are] those in which only one person needs to
succeed for the group to be successful, and conjunctive tasks [are] those in which
everyone’s contribution is critical. . . . Diversity works best on disjunctive tasks because
multiple approaches can be tried simultaneously, and one good idea means success for
everyone.”). As Professor Page points out, “[m]ost real world tasks are neither purely
disjunctive nor purely conjunctive,” id. at xv, which is likewise true for the work of a
plaintiffs’ steering committee. Conducting document review, for example, is likely to be a
conjunctive task where everyone’s contribution is critical and one missed document can
cause a host of problems. Making decisions about which arguments to pursue, however, is
more of a disjunctive task—only one person needs to propose a winning theory for the
group’s motion to succeed.
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1. Adequate-Representation Concerns
Lead-attorney hierarchies have not always held as much influ-
ence as they do today. Early groups coalesced mainly for convenience:
They pooled expertise and financing, hired experts, created trial hand-
books with “hot” documents, and even developed “schools” to train
lawyers with similar cases in trial techniques.67 But, absent unique
financing arrangements,68 group decision making did not bind non-
consenting attorneys, and leaders received fees solely from their own
clients.69
By contrast, today’s committees are formalized, far-reaching, and
obligatory. The recent Vioxx multidistrict litigation alone included at
least ten committees.70 These committees do not exist simply for
attorney convenience; they assume control of the litigation and their
duties usurp the traditional attorney’s daily responsibilities. Commit-
tees initiate and conduct discovery, act as spokespersons for all plain-
tiffs, call counsel meetings, examine and depose witnesses, coordinate
trial teams, select cases for bellwether trials, submit and argue
67 See Paul D. Rheingold, The Development of Litigation Groups, 6 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 1, 5–9 (1982) (describing litigation groups’ activities); Byron G. Stier, Resolving
the Class Action Crisis: Mass Tort Litigation as Network, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 863, 899–902
(discussing how plaintiffs’ groups arise for mutual advantages such as including
information and strategy harmonization). Examples of early groups include the late-1970s
swine flu multidistrict litigation, which had a single thirteen-person steering committee,
and the 1980s Dalkon Shield litigation, which had but one lead counsel. Rheingold, supra,
at 4.
68 See, e.g., Burch, supra note 16, at 1287 (discussing the Agent Orange financing
arrangement).
69 See Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Contingency Fees in Mass Torts: Access, Risk,
and the Provision of Legal Services When Layers of Lawyers Work for Individuals and
Collectives of Clients, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 425, 443 (1998) (noting that lead lawyers in the
L-Tryptophan litigation “received no premiums for their group service”); Mitchell A.
Lowenthal & Howard M. Erichson, Modern Mass Tort Litigation, Prior-Action
Depositions and Practice-Sensitive Procedure, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 989, 1006 (1995)
(“Notwithstanding the benefits of coordination, plaintiffs’ lawyers usually insist on
retaining ultimate control over their individual cases.”).
70 See Pretrial Orders and Minute Entries, MDL-1657 VIOXX PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LITIG., http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/vioxx/Orders/Orders.htm (last updated Dec. 18, 2014)
(referencing a Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee (PSC), Defendants’ Steering Committee,
State Liaison Committee, Plaintiffs’ Liaison Counsel, PSC Executive Committee, Fee
Allocation Committee, Third Party Payor Fee Allocation Committee, Government
Actions Plaintiffs’ Case Management Committee, and Private Third-Party Payor
Bellwether Trial Committee); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657 (E.D. La. Feb.
1, 2008) (Pretrial Order No. 6B) (confirming the functions, duties, and responsibilities of
the PSC, Plaintiffs’ Liaison Counsel, and the PSC Executive Committee). For another
example, see In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04-MD1596 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2011)
(Order No. 38) (appointing a plaintiffs’ steering committee to advise pro se litigants); see
also Jack B. Weinstein, The Democratization of Mass Actions in the Internet Age, 45
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 451, 454 (2012) (discussing the merits of a plaintiffs’ steering
committee for pro se litigants in mass actions).
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motions, and negotiate proposed settlements.71 The individually
retained attorney has no power to appoint or discharge the leaders
who assume control of her clients’ cases. Instead, she is relegated to
an observer who can do little more than complain that the lead law-
yers have violated their fiduciary obligations to the whole group.72
Evolving from organic, ad hoc groups to mandatory, formal com-
mittees has important implications for committee members’ fiduciary
obligations and adequate representation, particularly when group
members’ interests are in tension with one another. When ad hoc
groups were purely voluntary,73 the attorney consented to participate
and, since that decision fell within her agency authority, her consent
bound her client. But neither clients nor their attorneys freely consent
to multidistrict litigation or the subsequent selection of lead counsel
on their behalf.74 This non-voluntariness makes the committee
appointment process more akin to choosing class counsel—where
putative class members have no say in who represents them—than to
forming ad hoc attorney groups. Yet, unlike selecting class counsel,
judges seem to pay little attention to Amchem-like adequate-
representation concerns in multidistrict litigation.75
71 See, e.g., In re Bos. Scientific Corp., Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No.
2326, slip op. at 10 (S.D.W. Va. Feb. 29, 2012) (Pretrial Order No. 1) (outlining the
committee’s responsibilities regarding hearings and meetings); In re Avaulta Pelvic
Support Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2187, slip op. at 3 (S.D.W. Va. Feb 1, 2011)
(Pretrial Order No. 3) (outlining the duties and responsibilities of the Plaintiffs’ Lead
Counsel); In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” MDL No. 2179, slip op. at
2–4 (E.D. La. Oct. 8, 2010) (Pretrial Order No. 8) (outlining the responsibilities of the
Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee and the Plaintiff Executive Committee); In re Guidant
Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 05-1708 (DWF/AJB), 2005
WL 3704679, at *1 (D. Minn. Dec. 20, 2005) (outlining the responsibilities of the Plaintiffs’
Lead Counsel); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657, slip op. at 2–4 (E.D. La.
Apr. 8, 2005) (Pretrial Order No. 6) (outlining the Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee’s
responsibilities).
72 See In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 111 F.3d 220, 234 (1st Cir. 1997)
(“Whether or not there is a direct or formal attorney-client relationship between plaintiffs
and the PSC, the PSC and its [individually retained plaintiffs’ attorney] members
necessarily owed a fiduciary obligation to the plaintiffs.”); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 10.22 (2004) (describing the characteristics and responsibilities of
the lead counsel); Silver & Miller, supra note 13, at 118–20 (detailing the selection and
empowerment of managerial attorneys). Some judges, however, have made efforts to
ensure that the Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee keeps individually retained attorneys
informed of the litigation’s progress and have permitted individually retained attorneys to
participate in fee disputes by teleconference. See Weinstein, supra note 70, at 462 n.45
(noting a technique that he used in resolving the Zyprexa litigation).
73 For examples of voluntary litigation groups, see Rheingold, supra note 67, at 14
(citing Mer/29, the Pill, asbestos, and Ford transmission cases as examples).
74 Some judges have used actual contracts to tax participating attorneys at specified
rates. See infra notes 180–92 and accompanying text (discussing fee-transfer agreements).
75 See infra note 83 and accompanying text (describing structural conflicts of interest).
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Nevertheless, structural conflicts of interest among claimants or
between claimants and lead lawyers persist and may arise at multiple
points.76 Some conflicts will be apparent while trying to establish lia-
bility, such as significant differences in legal status, state laws,77
claims,78 or insurance coverage questions,79 while others may arise
only when contemplating remedies.80 Judges have attempted to quell
these adequate-representation fears by proclaiming that lead attor-
76 That is, a conflict of interest either between the “claimants and the lawyers who
would represent claimants on an aggregate basis” or “among the claimants themselves that
would present a significant risk that the lawyers for claimants might skew systematically
the conduct of the litigation so as to favor some claimants over others on grounds aside
from reasoned evaluation of their respective claims or to disfavor claimants generally . . . .”
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.07(a) (2010). Professor Coffee
identified four basic structural conflicts that may arise in mass-tort class actions:
(1) internal conflicts that exist within the class—typically, because
subcategories of class members are competing over the allocation of the
settlement; (2) external conflicts that arise because class members (or their
attorneys) have some extraneous reason for favoring a settlement that does
not truly benefit the interests of all class members; (3) risk conflicts that arise
because class members or class counsel have very different attitudes about the
level of risk they are willing to bear; and (4) conflicts over control of the
litigation.
John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in
Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 386 (2000). Although Professor Coffee
focused on class actions, the same conflicts can arise in multidistrict litigation.
77 When transferee courts do remand actions, they often cite case-specific differences in
state laws as a reason for remanding. E.g., In re Activated Carbon-Based Hunting Clothing
Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1200 (D. Minn. 2012); In re Light
Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litig., 832 F. Supp. 2d 74, 77 (D. Me. 2011); In re Nuvaring
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 4:08MD1964 RWS, 2009 WL 4825170, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 11,
2009).
78 See, e.g., In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., MDL No. 1811, slip op. at 2 (E.D.
Mo. Apr. 18, 2007) (appointing a separate representative for Mississippi farmers and
another representative for farmers who would prefer to litigate individually in state court).
For example, if lead lawyers’ clients asserted only economic claims, but the entire plaintiff
group included members with economic and physical injury claims, the attorneys may be
less inclined to represent those with physical injuries.
79 E.g., Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 941, 959
(W.D. Wis. 2008) (subclassing a class action because of different statutes of limitation);
Maloney v. Califano, 88 F.R.D. 293, 294–95 (D.N.M. 1980) (subclassing based on the time
taken by the government to make disability determinations); see also Daley v. Provena
Hosps., 193 F.R.D. 526, 527–30 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (subclassing debtors who received different
form letters); Francis v. Davidson, 340 F. Supp. 351, 361 (D. Md. 1972) (subclassing
unemployed fathers who had applied unsuccessfully for certain benefits but were denied
benefits for different reasons).
80 For example, if some claimants required immediate medical attention, they would
receive far less benefit from a settlement that provided research funds. See Bowling v.
Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141, 160 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (including claimants who had to have
their heart valve removed immediately and thus did not benefit from the settlement’s
research-and-development fund without special representation); see also JAY TIDMARSH,
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MASS TORT SETTLEMENT CLASS ACTIONS: FIVE CASES 43 (1998)
(expressing concern over the lack of separate representation in Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc.).
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neys have a duty to represent all plaintiffs.81 Of course, class counsel
has the same obligation.82 But, without determining whether group
members’ interests are cohesive, simply recognizing that the obliga-
tion exists does not iron out conflicts or reduce incentives to sell out a
segment of the group. Claiming otherwise contradicts the Supreme
Court’s principal ruling in Amchem: Attorneys cannot simultaneously
represent group members with fundamentally incompatible inter-
ests.83 Accordingly, papering over conflicts with a generic, fiduciary
veneer is a nonviable fix.
In fact, multidistrict litigation heightens concerns about inade-
quate representation.84 Although plaintiffs technically consent to
settle and thus “opt in,” the dynamics of all-or-nothing settlements85
and settlements where attorneys threaten to withdraw from repre-
senting nonsettling clients86 undermine clients’ theoretical autonomy.
And, unlike in class actions, plaintiffs who feel inadequately repre-
sented cannot collaterally attack a settlement by contending that
counsel failed to represent them in the first suit.87 These plaintiffs
must simply rely on their individual attorneys, who may be unable to
effectively voice clients’ concerns because the committee negotiating
Bowling would likely proceed as multidistrict litigation rather than a class action if litigated
today.
81 See In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 111 F.3d 220, 234 (1st Cir. 1997)
(addressing the lead attorney’s fiduciary duties to the class plaintiffs). Group
representation under forced multidistrict litigation circumstances differs even from that in
collective representation where clients can consent to their attorney representing and
advancing the group’s aggregate interests. See Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class
Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003
U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 519, 529–30 (discussing individual attorneys representing clients as a
group). Committee appointments more closely resemble class-counsel appointments. In
class actions, counsel have to represent the best interests of all class members, but because
members have not consented to being represented in any meaningful way, their interests
must be cohesive. When interests differ, as did the interests of those with present and
future claims in Amchem, members must have separate representatives. Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626–27 (1997).
82 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(4) (detailing the duties of class counsel).
83 See 521 U.S. at 626–27; see also infra notes 259–60 and accompanying text
(describing structural conflicts of interest).
84 I have elaborated elsewhere on the relative degrees of cohesion and difference
among plaintiffs’ positions in aggregate litigation. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch,
Litigating Groups, 61 ALA. L. REV. 1, 25–36 (2009).
85 See Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements, 58 KAN. L.
REV. 979, 982–83 (2010) (chronicling the ethical abuses potentially arising from all-or-
nothing settlements).
86 See Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 48, at 279–92 (highlighting the ethical problems
resulting from mandatory recommendation and mandatory withdrawal provisions).
87 See McNeil v. Guthrie, 945 F.2d 1163, 1167 (10th Cir. 1991) (listing options available
to plaintiffs in class actions); Baylor v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 913 F.2d 223,
225 (5th Cir. 1990) (discussing collateral attack in the class-action setting); Gillespie v.
Crawford, 858 F.2d 1101, 1102–03 (5th Cir. 1988) (same).
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the settlement offer denied them a seat at the table and the offer
requires that individual attorneys recommend the deal to all or none
of their clients. One solution then is to ensure that the lead lawyers
around the table represent plaintiffs’ different views, a solution that
the Manual for Complex Litigation endorses.88
The Manual for Complex Litigation makes two important but
often overlooked points about adequate representation. First, it
observes that “[c]ommittees are most commonly needed when group
members’ interests and positions are sufficiently dissimilar to justify
giving them representation in decision making.”89 Second, it suggests
that courts consider “whether designated counsel fairly represent the
various interests in the litigation” and “where diverse interests
exist . . . designate a committee of counsel representing different inter-
ests.”90 Nevertheless, practice demonstrates that courts stress the
Manual’s other criteria—attorneys’ experience, financial resources,
and cooperative abilities91—perhaps because they are easier to assess
without knowing much about the plaintiffs themselves.92 After all,
judges typically appoint a plaintiffs’ steering committee within a few
weeks of receiving the transferred cases and before most discovery
ensues.93
Two additional judicial practices may likewise compound
adequate-representation concerns: appointing attorneys to leadership
88 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 72, §§ 10.221, 10.224 (classifying
organizational structures for lead lawyers and the court’s responsibilities); Elizabeth
Chamblee Burch, Procedural Justice in Nonclass Aggregation, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1,
37–43 (2009) (emphasizing issues relating to litigants’ participation, voice, and control).
89 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 72, §§ 10.221, 10.224 (“[B]ecause
appointment of designated counsel will alter the usual dynamics of client representation in
important ways, attorneys will have legitimate concerns that their clients’ interests be
adequately represented.”).
90 Id. § 10.224.
91 See, e.g., In re Bos. Scientific Corp., Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No.
2326, slip op. at 9 (S.D.W. Va. Feb. 29, 2012) (Pretrial Order No. 1) (“The main criteria for
PSC membership will be: (a) willingness and availability to commit to a time-consuming
project; (b) ability to work cooperatively with others; and (c) professional experience in
this type of litigation.”); see also Dubay, supra note 57, at 39 (“While the MCL4th suggests
consideration of reasonableness of rates and diversity of representation, the courts with
specific orders as to qualifications focused on experience in MDLs or complex litigation
and the ability and resources to commit to the leadership responsibilities.”).
92 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 72, § 10.224 (listing factors the
court should assess when evaluating counsel).
93 Judge Fallon appointed the Plaintiffs’ Liaison Committee in the same month he
received the initial transfer and appointed the Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee within two
months. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657 (J.P.M.L. Feb. 16, 2005)
(transferring cases to the Eastern District of Louisiana pursuant to § 1407); In re Vioxx
Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657 (E.D. La. Feb. 28, 2005) (Pretrial Order No. 2)
(appointing Plaintiffs’ Liaison Counsel); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657
(E.D. La. April 8, 2005) (Pretrial Order No. 6) (appointing Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee).
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positions who have no involved clients94 and ratifying plaintiffs’ attor-
neys’ proposed leadership slate. First, when judges appoint counsel
without affected clients, attorneys may feel more beholden to the
judge than the plaintiffs. In theory, appointing a clientless lawyer les-
sens the fear that her duty to the group may conflict with her clients’
specific interests and might add an alternative perspective.95 But
attorneys who are untethered to clients have little incentive to under-
stand and identify conflicting interests, cannot be fired or replaced by
plaintiffs’ counsel, and serve purely at the court’s behest. Plus, judges’
incentives and objectives differ from clients’ incentives and goals:
transferee judges generally want to achieve global settlements that
will land them additional interesting and challenging multidistrict liti-
gation assignments,96 whereas plaintiffs want everything from com-
pensation to an apology or injunctive relief.97 Moreover, clientless
lawyers’ compensation comes entirely from the court’s ruling on fees,
not private retainers. As Professors Silver and Miller have pointed
out, this means that “a clientless lawyer will rationally want to settle
on any terms a defendant will offer . . . [because she] has no stake in
the MDL’s upside potential, but will suffer greatly if negotiations
fail.”98
Second, when judges ratify plaintiffs’ attorneys’ picks for key
positions, they can amplify adequate-representation concerns
94 For example, Judge Weinstein appointed Melvyn I. Weiss as chair of the Zyprexa
Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee even though he had no clients with pending claims in the
litigation. And Judge Fallon appointed Russ Herman as liaison counsel despite having only
a few clients. As Professors Silver and Miller point out, both Weiss and Herman are
experienced deal makers. Silver & Miller, supra note 13, at 151. But see Dubay, supra note
57, at 39, 62 (observing that “in the Prempro MDL, the court specifically allowed the
addition of PSC members without active MDL cases over the defendants’ objections,” yet
noting that “representation of a plaintiff in a pending MDL may be necessary for some
leadership positions, but not for others”).
95 See Barbara J. Rothstein, Francis E. McGovern & Sarah Jael Dion, A Model Mass
Tort: The PPA Experience, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 621, 625–26 (2006) (addressing concerns
that arise during expert discovery).
96 See DeLaventura v. Columbia Acorn Trust, 417 F. Supp. 2d 147, 152 (D. Mass. 2006)
(“[I]t is almost a point of honor among transferee judges acting pursuant to Section
1407(a) that cases so transferred shall be settled rather than sent back to their home courts
for trial. . . . Indeed, MDL practice actively encourages retention even of trial-ready cases
in order to ‘encourage’ settlement.”).
97 See Gillian K. Hadfield, Framing the Choice Between Cash and the Courthouse:
Experiences with the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 645, 645
(2008) (showing the tradeoff between a cash payment and the pursuit of litigation); Tamara
Relis, “It’s Not About the Money!”: A Theory on Misconceptions of the Plaintiffs’ Litigation
Aims, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 341, 363 (2006) (“Plaintiffs’ articulated litigation aims were
largely composed of extra-legal objectives of principle, with 41% not mentioning monetary
compensation at all, 35% saying it was of secondary importance, 18% describing money as
their primary objective in suing, and only one person (6%) saying it was money alone.”).
98 Silver & Miller, supra note 13, at 151.
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depending on the committee position. Judges tend to use one of two
methods to select lead lawyers: a consensus method, where informal
attorney networks choose their own leaders and the judge then con-
firms that slate,99 or a competitive selection process where the court
invites submissions and chooses among them. In the Vioxx litigation,
for example, plaintiffs’ attorneys nominated Chris Seeger and Andy
Birchfield as co-lead attorneys over dinner in New Orleans; Judge
Fallon then made their appointment official.100
Relying on self-selection methods can encourage undisclosed fee-
sharing arrangements that may adversely affect settlement incen-
tives,101 tit-for-tat reciprocity among repeat players, “good ol’ boy net-
works,”102 and unrepresentative committees.103 Lawyers have little
incentive to consider adequate representation when brokering a con-
sensus since representing more people leads to a higher fee and a
99 E.g., In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., MDL No. 1811, slip op. at 1–2 (E.D. Mo.
Apr. 18, 2007) (appointing leadership counsel and observing that the group “most closely
meets the ‘private ordering’ concept, because it has support of the larger number of
plaintiffs and lawyers involved”); In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., MDL No.
1629, slip op. at 7–10 (D. Mass. Dec. 16, 2004) (Corrected Case Management Order)
(appointing plaintiffs’ counsel’s proposed slate). The first Manual for Complex Litigation
recommended this approach, though it changed course by the second edition and advised
judges to oversee the appointment process. Compare MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
(FIRST) §§ 1.92, 4.53 (1982), with MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) § 20.224
(1985). See also Rheingold, supra note 67, at 3–4 (“[T]he court sets the ground rules for a
steering committee, and the decision of the committee binds all of the cases made part of
the litigation. However, even then the actual selection of the members of the committee . . .
is usually left for the group to decide.”). Informal selection methods vary and may simply
be based on a vote of attorneys invited to a particular meeting.
100 See SNIGDHA PRAKASH, ALL THE JUSTICE MONEY CAN BUY 13–14 (2011)
(describing the nomination and selection process). To be clear, my point is not that
Birchfield and Seeger were unqualified for the position, but that—as Judge Fallon has
recognized—self-selection methods can generate suboptimal incentives. In re Vioxx Prods.
Liab. Litig., 760 F. Supp. 2d 640, 643 n.4 (E.D. La. 2010) (“Moreover, the selection of lead
counsel by their fellow attorneys would involve intrigue and side agreements which would
make MacBeth appear to be a juvenile manipulator. Frequently, recommendations by
attorneys for positions on leadership committees are governed more on friendship, past
commitments and future hopes than on current issues.”). For another example, see Daniel
Wise, Lawyers Pack World Trade Center Hearing, N.Y. L.J., May 9, 1994, at 1 (describing
how lawyers involved in the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 created their own
steering committee and submitted it to the judge for approval).
101 E.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1452 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
(approving a plaintiffs’ management committee’s internal fee-splitting agreement that
would give financing attorneys three times the amount they advanced to finance the
litigation), rev’d, 818 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1987).
102 The majority of repeat players remain male. See infra Appendix tbl.1 (eleven of fifty
attorneys on this list are female, or approximately 22%).
103 See In re Vioxx, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 643 n.4 (discussing the membership selection
process for committees). But see Silver & Miller, supra note 13, at 160–69 (arguing in favor
of appointing lawyers with the largest client list to lead positions and then allowing them to
appoint attorneys to perform common-benefit work).
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greater ability to invest in the litigation.104 And, because the multidis-
trict litigation statute requires only a common question of fact, plain-
tiffs’ claims need not be cohesive.105 Consequently, attorneys have
little reason to call attention to divisions among their clients or con-
sider those differences when proposing candidates.
Consensus selection is also problematic because the relevant
plaintiff’s bar is fairly small and the attorneys must work together fre-
quently.106 Thus, reputation and reciprocity matter among this group.
Asked privately, attorneys might candidly assess their peers, but pub-
licly they may silence themselves out of concern that they will be
ostracized and thus ineligible for future leadership positions. As such,
they may rely solely on others’ signals even if their own preferences
conflict with the majority.107 They are more apt to conform since the
circumstances make it politically untenable to express dissenting
views.108
Despite these concerns, consensus selection is actually preferable
when appointing liaison counsel as opposed to lead counsel or
steering committee members. Liaison counsel acts as a middleman
between the court and plaintiffs’ counsel by disseminating informa-
tion, calling meetings, resolving scheduling conflicts, and maintaining
document databanks.109 Given that many attorneys have worked
together before, they are likely to have superior knowledge about law-
yers’ responsiveness and organizational skills. Thus, appointing the
consensus nominee may work to the plaintiffs’ and the judge’s advan-
tage, particularly if attorneys reached consensus through a secret
ballot, which helps alleviate backlash concerns.110
104 See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Together: Social, Moral, and Legal
Obligations, 91 B.U. L. REV. 87, 121 (2011).
105 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012) (requiring a common question of fact), with FED.
R. CIV. P. 23(a) (requiring a common question of law or fact and adequate representation),
and FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring that common questions predominate over
individual ones).
106 See infra Part II.A.2 (providing data on repeat players in leadership positions).
107 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 62, at 57 (describing an analogous phenomenon with
medical doctors).
108 See Cass R. Sunstein, Conformity and Dissent 23 (Pub. Law & Legal Theory,
Working Paper No. 34, 2002) (noting that in cascades, “[p]eople will often neglect their
own private information and defer to the information provided by their predecessors”).
109 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 72, at § 10.221 (defining the
role of a liaison counsel).
110 Using a secret ballot helps overcome the pressure toward conformity and consensus.
See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 62, at 14–36 (discussing conformity and dissent);
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 245–46 (2011) (“[T]he proper way to
elicit information from a group is not by starting with a public discussion but by
confidentially collecting each person’s judgment.”).
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2. Repeat-Player Concerns
When judges emphasize experience, cooperation, and financial
resources in selecting lead lawyers, they may winnow the eligible
attorney pool to repeat players. Although having some experienced
repeat attorneys in key positions could benefit plaintiffs by offsetting
repeat play on the defense side, repeat play can also create fertile soil
for collusion, reciprocity concerns, and incentives to protect one’s deal
making or collaborative reputation at the expense of uniquely situated
clients. Both repeat players and aspiring repeat players have rational
economic incentives to protect their reputations and develop recip-
rocal relationships to form funding coalitions,111 receive client refer-
rals, share information, and streamline tasks like document review.112
As such, extralegal, interpersonal, or business concerns may govern
their interactions. Nonconforming lawyers may be ostracized and
informally sanctioned, which promotes cooperation, but deters dissent
and vigorous representation.113
Accordingly, to achieve some sense of how prevalent repeat
players (individual attorneys and law firms) are in multidistrict litiga-
tion, I collected data from the seventy-two product-liability and sales-
practices multidistrict litigations that were pending as of May 14,
2013.114 If repeat players exist, these cases should provide a represen-
111 For example, the Vioxx Litigation Consortium included lawyers from five law firms
and the Polybutylene Plumbing Litigation included forty-nine law firms. In re Polybutylene
Plumbing Litig., 23 S.W.3d 428, 435 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000); Silver & Miller, supra note 13, at
126.
112 See HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY
FEE LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 220–23 (2004) (analyzing the role of
reputation in contingent-fee practice and referrals); Stier, supra note 67, at 896–904
(describing networks of plaintiffs’ counsel and the information sharing and referrals that
occur between lawyers). Several sprawling, formal groups of plaintiffs’ lawyers have
formed over the years. E.g., Who We Are, AM. ASS’N FOR JUST., http://www.justice.org/
who-we-are (last visited Feb. 2, 2015) (formerly the Association of Trial Lawyers of
America).
113 See Armin Falk et al., Driving Forces Behind Informal Sanctions, 73 ECONOMETRICA
2017, 2028–29 (2005) (finding that cooperating group members impose the most severe
sanctions on defectors and that retaliation is a driving factor behind fairness-driven
informal sanctions); Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Why Social Preferences Matter—The
Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives, 112 ECON. J.
C1, C2–C3 (2002) (evaluating the social preference for reciprocity). Reciprocity and
reputational concerns, along with trustworthiness, are most robust when people cooperate
with one another over time in repeated interactions. See Frans van Dijk et al., Social Ties
in a Public Good Experiment, 85 J. PUB. ECON. 275, 291–92 (2002) (discussing the
implications of public-good experiments on reciprocity).
114 I identified the relevant cases using the Panel’s list of pending MDLs as of May 14,
2013. Because many of the same attorneys who litigate product-liability cases were also
involved in the Deepwater Horizon oil spill litigation, the litigation in front of Judge
Barbier was also included. Two cases mentioned on the May 14, 2013, list were excluded
because the orders were not electronically available (In re “Factor VIII or IX Concentrate
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tative sample for several reasons. First, product liability and sales
practices comprise the largest portion of pending cases, constituting
well over one-third of all multidistrict litigation.115 Second, examining
pending cases on a certain date includes data from cases transferred
over a twenty-two-year span.116 Third, to the extent possible, I
included data from all orders appointing lead lawyers (plaintiffs’
steering committees, plaintiffs’ liaison committees, discovery commit-
tees, trial committees, etc.), not just lead counsel or the plaintiffs’
steering committee. When taken as a whole, this information should
give an accurate sense of the scale of repeat play.
The data confirmed that repeat players are prevalent. Although
only 31% of individual attorneys involved in multidistrict litigation
were named to one or more leadership positions, the total number of
positions this small group occupied is more revealing: repeat players
held 749 out of 1177 available leadership positions, or 63.6%.117 Fifty
attorneys were named as lead lawyers in five or more multidistrict
litigations and claimed 30% of all leadership roles.118
Repeat play among law firms was even more evident. Again,
even though only 40.7% of law firms were repeat players in these
suits,119 lawyers from those firms occupied 78% of all available leader-
ship positions.120 Seventy law firms had attorneys who were named to
five or more leadership roles, and attorneys from those firms were
Blood Products” Products Liability Litigation, which began in 1993, and In re Methyl
Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Products Liability Litigation, which began in 2000). In re
Plavix Marketing, Sales Practices & Products Liability Litigation is a new MDL, and
therefore only interim counsel, appointed on July 25, 2013, is included. Finally, I could
identify only interim counsel in In re Toyota Motor Corp. Hybrid Brake Marketing, Sales
Practices & Products Liability Litigation. This litigation currently contains only fourteen
cases and is pending in front of Judge Carney.
115 See U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., CALENDAR YEAR STATISTICS
OF THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 12 (2012),
available at http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/JPML_Calendar_Year_Statistics-
2012.pdf (showing 34 sales-practices multidistrict litigations and 72 products-liability
litigations out of 291 total multidistrict litigations).
116 As noted in footnote 114, two older cases were excluded because the orders were not
available electronically, but In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation, which began in
1991, is included in the data.
117 There were 624 different individuals appointed to leadership positions and 195 of
them were named more than once.
118 See infra Appendix tbl.1 (listing attorneys who were named as lead lawyers in five or
more product-liability multidistrict litigations).
119 There were 429 unique law firms involved, and 175 of those firms had attorneys who
were appointed to more than one leadership position.
120 Two judges named entire law firms as lead or liaison counsel. Where possible, only
the attorneys from the named law firm who were “to be noticed by the court” on PACER
were included in the data. Thus, the number of available leadership positions from the law
firm perspective was 1183, and lawyers from firms named more than once occupied 927 of
those leadership positions.
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appointed to well over half of all lead-lawyer positions.121 Put starkly,
16% of the involved law firms held nearly 54% of all leadership
positions.
These numbers include five separate multidistrict litigations over
pelvic repair systems transferred to Judge Goodwin.122 Judge
Goodwin named the same sixty-two attorneys as lead lawyers in four
of those five cases.123 While closely coordinating discovery, pretrial
rulings, and counsel prevents inconsistent rulings and redundant
requests, appointing the same lead lawyers is evidence of repeat play
and poses the same associated concerns.124 Nevertheless, coding those
four litigations as one would reduce the percentage of repeat play:
Repeat attorneys would hold 54.9% of all lead-lawyer positions and
repeat law firms would occupy 73.2% of the available positions.125
Some judges appeared to be more inclined to appoint repeat
players than others.126 For example, repeat players held seven out of
ten positions in In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Products Liability Litigation;
fifteen out of seventeen in In re Yasmin & Yaz Marketing, Sales Prac-
tices & Products Liability Litigation; eight out of nine in In re
Propulsid Products Liability Litigation; eighteen out of twenty-two in
In re Actos Products Liability Litigation; and seventeen out of
nineteen in In re Zimmer Nexgen Knee Implant Products Liability
Litigation. By contrast, in In re Ford Motor Co. E-350 Van Products
Liability Litigation (No. II), Judge Salas appointed only two repeat
players out of eleven lead-lawyer positions, and, in In re ConAgra
121 Specifically, attorneys named as lead lawyers from those seventy firms occupied 638
of 1183 available positions, or 53.9% of all the lead-lawyer positions.
122 See In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d
1359, 1360 (J.P.M.L. 2012) (“The actions in each MDL share factual issues arising from
allegations of defects in pelvic surgical mesh products manufactured by AMS, Boston
Scientific, and Ethicon, respectively.”).
123 The same attorneys were named as lead lawyers in In re American Medical Systems,
Inc. Pelvic Repair Systems Products Liability Litigation, In re Boston Scientific Corp. Pelvic
Repair Systems Products Liability Litigation, In re C.R. Bard, Inc. Pelvic Repair Systems
Products Liability Litigation, and In re Ethicon, Inc. Pelvic Repair Systems Products
Liability Litigation. In re Coloplast Corp. Pelvic Support Systems Products Liability
Litigation, with the smallest number of cases, did not have identical lead lawyers
appointed.
124 For more on this, see infra notes 130–45 and accompanying text.
125 Coding those four litigations as one would reduce the number of available lead-
lawyer positions to 998; 548 of those positions were filled by attorneys who were also lead
lawyers in other multidistrict litigations. Likewise, it reduces the number of positions for
law firms to 1004; 735 of those positions were filled by lawyers from firms named more
than once. Asterisks in Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix illustrate the effect this anomaly
would have on those numbers.
126 The database did not take into account the date that lead lawyers were appointed, so
it could be that one particular judge appointed an attorney first and that others then
followed suit.
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Peanut Butter Products Liability Litigation, Judge Thrash selected
only five repeat players to serve in nineteen leadership positions.
In many ways, these findings are unsurprising; repeat players in
highly specialized legal fields are common. As Professor Coffee recog-
nized nearly twenty years ago, fewer than fifty firms specialized in
asbestos litigation, and even then only “a handful dominate[d] the
field,” namely because attorneys need large case inventories to make
mass litigation economically feasible.127 Those circumstances have
escalated in the years since: Mass litigation is increasingly expensive (a
single Vioxx case initially cost between $1 million and $1.5 million to
develop),128 and it may take years before attorneys receive a return on
their investment.129 Thus, when judges want experienced attorneys
who can afford to finance not only their own clients’ claims but uni-
fied discovery as well, the pool of “qualified” candidates is relatively
small.
Although experience, financing abilities, and cooperative tenden-
cies seem to be compelling selling points,130 there are several reasons
why appointing solely or predominately repeat players may fail to
serve plaintiffs’ best interests. First, seeking candidates with coopera-
tive tendencies further encourages rational attorneys playing the
“long game” to curry favor with one another and position themselves
for future appointments. Leadership positions result in increased fees,
prestige, and marketing opportunities.131 Voicing the concerns of a
minority of plaintiffs (particularly when one has not been specifically
delegated that task) can be politically unpopular and brand the dis-
senter a defector. Speaking up, for example, could derail a settlement
that would generate a significant payoff for other plaintiffs’ attorneys.
Over time, expressing those opinions could lead to a reputation for
being contrary and uncooperative, which would, in turn, decrease
lucrative leadership opportunities.
Second, groups of repeat players who shun dissent are more
likely to be infected by group decision-making biases such as cascade
127 John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1364–65 (1995); see also Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt,
The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An Institutional Account of American Tort Law,
57 VAND. L. REV. 1571, 1590–96 (2004) (discussing the emergence of select repeat
players).
128 See Joe Nocera, Forget Fair; It’s Litigation as Usual, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2007, at C1
(noting the significant resources expended developing a case).
129 See Burch, supra note 16, at 1285–87 (detailing the financial risks of aggregate
litigation).
130 The Manual for Complex Litigation recommends these traits. See MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 72, § 10.221.
131 Dubay, supra note 57, at 9.
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and conformity effects,132 confirmation bias, and group polariza-
tion.133 Cascades can occur when a few people signal that a particular
position is correct and others fall in line in lieu of relying on their own
contradictory information, whether that information concerns ethical
obligations or knowledge that some clients might receive no benefit
from proposed remedial relief.134 The initial signal might be mis-
informed, such that mentioning this information or dissenting would
alter the outcome, but when reciprocity and reputation are important,
the tendency is to stay silent.135
Confirmation bias afflicts group decision making when members’
convictions cause them to discount contradictory evidence or interpret
information in a way that supports their existing beliefs.136 Similarly,
group polarization—where a committee may adopt a more extreme
position after discussing it with others who are likeminded137—occurs
with greater frequency and intensity when group members are con-
nected through friendship, mutual affection, or solidarity as repeat
132 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 62, at 62 (“Cascade effects and blunders are significantly
increased if people are rewarded not for correct decisions but for decisions that conform to
the decisions made by most people.”); Stefan Schulz-Hardt et al., Productive Conflict in
Group Decision Making: Genuine and Contrived Dissent as Strategies to Counteract Biased
Information Seeking, 88 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 563, 564
(2002) (“[F]ormal and informal conformity pressures and the desire to preserve harmony
within a group can override the motivation to critically appraise the relevant facts, thus
(often) leading to poor decisions.”).
133 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 62, at 112, 118 (observing that “[a] deliberating group ends
up taking a more extreme position than its median member took before deliberation
began,” a concept known as “group polarization,” and that “those with a minority position
often silence themselves or otherwise have disproportionately little weight in group
deliberations”); Schulz-Hardt et al., supra note 132, at 564–65 (2002) (“‘[C]onfirmation
bias’ (preference for information confirming one’s position) was most pronounced in
groups in which all members had favored the same alternative individually (so-called
‘homogeneous groups’) . . . .”). Repeat play and agency relationships may, however,
dampen other biases. Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein & Samuel Issacharoff, Creating
Convergence: Debiasing Biased Litigants, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 913, 921 (1997).
134 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 62, at 55–56, 74–75 (defining and analyzing cascades).
135 See id. at 74–75 (introducing reputational cascades).
136 See Joshua Klayman, Varieties of Confirmation Bias, in DECISION MAKING FROM A
COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVE 385, 385–87, 398 (Jerome Busemeyer et al. eds., 1995) (defining
confirmation bias); Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon
in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 178, 210 (1998) (explaining the preferential
treatment of confirmatory evidence).
137 See Michael A. Hogg, Social Identity, Self-Categorization, and the Small Group, in 2
UNDERSTANDING GROUP BEHAVIOR 227, 234 (Erich H. Witte & James H. Davis eds.,
1996) (“[T]raditional explanations of group polarization fall into two broad categories: (a)
those that emphasize compliance, for self-presentational motives . . . and (b) those that
emphasize the intrinsic persuasiveness of novel arguments brought up in discussion that
support one’s original position.”).
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players may be.138 Confident experts—such as successful repeat
players—are even more likely to polarize groups.139 So, if a steering
committee discusses ways to encourage plaintiffs to accept its pro-
posed settlement, but its members are unlikely to dissent, the discus-
sion could lead them to adopt increasingly coercive terms like
mandatory recommendation and withdrawal provisions.140
Third, appointing solely or predominantly repeat players and
emphasizing cooperation promotes consistent thinking and may not
provide plaintiffs with the most innovative representation.141 Groups
with cognitively diverse members—people with alternative perspec-
tives, interpretations, and heuristics who are outside powerful lawyers’
stable of go-to people—may be more capable problem solvers and
may identify more successful solutions than homogeneous groups
when performing disjunctive tasks.142 Disjunctive tasks are those in
which only one person needs to propose a winning strategy or idea in
order for everyone to succeed (determining the best legal theory,
138 SUNSTEIN, supra note 62, at 79, 129–30; cf. Michael A. Hogg & Sarah C. Hains,
Friendship and Group Identification: A New Look at the Role of Cohesiveness in
Groupthink, 28 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 323, 323–36 (1998) (finding that group
identification and social attraction contributed to group polarization effects while
friendship ties did not).
139 SUNSTEIN, supra note 62, at 129; Maryla Zaleska, The Stability of Extreme and
Moderate Responses in Different Situations, in GROUP DECISION MAKING 163, 164
(Hermann Brandsta¨tter et al. eds., 1982); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Behavioral Decision
Theory in the Court of Public Law, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 671, 675 (2002) (stating that
experts are more likely to overestimate their actual knowledge of their field of expertise
and are prone to more routinized ways of thinking when it comes to approaching problems
in their field). Individuals working alone do, however, tend to brainstorm more ideas than
groups. Gayle W. Hill, Group Versus Individual Performance: Are N + 1 Heads Better than
One?, 91 PSYCHOL. BULL. 517, 527 (1982).
140 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, GOING TO EXTREMES: HOW LIKE MINDS UNITE AND DIVIDE
3 (2009) (describing how group polarization leads to outcomes more extreme than initial
individual inclinations would have indicated); JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF
CROWDS 184–85 (2004) (describing these group polarization effects, particularly on groups’
risk preferences); Michael A. Hogg & Scott A. Reid, Social Identity, Self-Categorization,
and the Communication of Group Norms, 16 COMM. THEORY 7, 18–19 (2006) (discussing
the tendency of groups to adhere to group norms in reaching decisions); see also, e.g., supra
notes 48–49 and accompanying text (discussing the Vioxx settlement).
141 See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657, slip op. at 1–2 (E.D. La. June 25,
2009) (Pretrial Order No. 42) (emphasizing cooperation as a criterion for membership in a
plaintiffs’ steering committee). Although transferee judges rarely explain their rationale
for appointing particular attorneys, this basic assumption regarding homogeneity has been
true in the securities class-action context, where judges issue reasoned opinions about why
they selected particular lead plaintiffs. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Optimal Lead Plaintiffs,
64 VAND. L. REV. 1109, 1139–41 (2011).
142 See PAGE, supra note 65, at xiv–xv (finding that diversity helps the most with
disjunctive tasks); Issacharoff, supra note 139, at 675 (“[Experts] are subject to routinized
ways of approaching problems and to an unreflective ‘group think’ style of inbred
behavior.”).
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identifying successful negotiating tactics, and selecting which issues to
appeal, for example), as opposed to conjunctive tasks in which eve-
ryone must perform well for the group to succeed.143 Accordingly, to
the extent that repeat play and fear of dissent promote uniform
thinking, repeat players may be less innovative than outsider attor-
neys when performing disjunctive tasks.
Finally, appointing repeat players may increase the likelihood of
collusive settlements. Repeat players, aggregation, and judges who
want to settle are the three traditional factors that enable collusion.144
And now that most multidistrict litigation settles without class certifi-
cation, even the most vigilant judge lacks the formal tools to probe
behind the scenes of what has then become a nonadversarial process.
These concerns over collusive conditions, cognitive homogeneity
among lead lawyers, disincentives to dissent, and decision-making
biases add up to an overarching disquiet about whether repeat players
can adequately represent the entire plaintiff group. While the tempta-
tion to appoint repeat players is understandable because judges know
that their personalities are conducive to deal making and that they are
dependable emissaries, convenience should not outweigh constitu-
tional due process. Alleviating adequate-representation concerns
demands a healthy infusion of new entrants, procedures that tolerate
and promote dissent, and special appointments to represent plaintiffs
with conflicting interests.145
B. Awarding and Cutting Attorneys’ Fees
As the push to become a lead lawyer suggests, attorneys’ fees in
multidistrict litigation are big business. Merck’s Vioxx defense fees
ran more than $600 million annually, and the settlement yielded plain-
tiffs’ firms nearly $2 billion.146 While defense fees are typically paid
through billable hours, plaintiffs’ attorneys often have their clients
sign contingent-fee contracts, which entitle counsel to some per-
centage of her client’s settlement or judgment—typically in the neigh-
borhood of 33%.147 When collected from thousands of clients,
attorneys’ fees can be staggering—one of the many reasons that
143 See PAGE, supra note 65, at xv (explaining the difference between disjunctive and
conjunctive tasks). Conducting document review is a conjunctive task; one missed, critical
document can pose setbacks for the entire group, so everyone’s contribution is critical.
144 Chamblee, supra note 28, at 170–71.
145 Infra Part III.A.
146 Berenson, supra note 1.
147 Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal
Practice, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 285–86 (1998).
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judges feel compelled to intervene.148 Compared to class-action
awards, which average around 20%,149 these fees may seem excessive.
Consequently, judges have grappled with two critical questions: (1)
how to compensate lead attorneys using a coherent rationale, and (2)
how lead lawyers’ compensation should affect the fees of non-lead
attorneys who no longer have to bear the lion’s share of the work or
the financing risk.
1. Compensating Common-Benefit Work
To justify awarding fees to lead lawyers, judges have borrowed ad
hoc from class-action law’s common-fund doctrine,150 contract princi-
ples, ethics, and equity. As this section explores, each theory standing
alone is too sparse and cannot fully explain fee awards. But lumped
together, these theories appear to create a seamless facade. Yet, this
doctrinal patchwork lacks predictable limits, prompts unexpected
awards, and can undermine attorneys’ incentives to shoulder complex,
time-consuming cases.151
First, even though judges often deny class certification,152 they
nevertheless tend to invoke the class action’s common-fund doctrine
to compensate lead lawyers.153 The common-fund doctrine rests on
148 See Curtis & Resnik, supra note 69, at 434 (“[T]he work of judges on attorneys’ fees
in all kinds of cases has exposed the courts to billing practices that upset them; judges have
become impatient and distressed at the size of bills and the relationships between
outcomes and costs.”). Of course, defense fees can be staggering, too, but judges rarely
interfere with those fees.
149 See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees and Expenses in Class
Action Settlements: 1993–2008, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 248, 258 (2010) (examining
class-action awards from 1993 to 2008 and concluding that “[t]he mean fee to recovery
ratio was 0.23, or 23 percent of the class award, but this percent varies by recovery size”);
Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards,
7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 831 tbl.7 (2010) (concluding that fees and expenses in
class actions averaged 20% of the total settlement awards in 2007). For a detailed
explanation of why multidistrict litigation costs attorneys more money to litigate than class
actions, see Burch, supra note 16, at 1288–91.
150 This is also referred to as the “common-benefit doctrine.”
151 I suggest an alternative rationale in Part III.B.
152 E.g., In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 498, 499 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) (denying class certification because of the variety of illnesses alleged and other
dissimilarities between plaintiffs); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450, 463 (E.D.
La. 2006) (denying plaintiffs’ motion to certify a personal-injury class); Sinclair v. Merck &
Co., Inc., 948 A.2d 587, 595–96 (N.J. 2008) (affirming the decision not to certify a Vioxx
medical-monitoring class).
153 E.g., In re Nineteen Appeals Arising out of San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig.,
982 F.2d 603, 606–07 (1st Cir. 1992); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 802 F. Supp. 2d 740,
770–71 (E.D. La. 2011); In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., No. 4:06 MD 1811 CDP,
2010 WL 716190, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 24, 2010); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable
Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708 (DWF/AJB), 2008 WL 682174, at *4
(D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 491–92
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restitution principles: A self-appointed, non-contractually-retained
attorney litigates on behalf of absent class members and benefits them
when she settles (the “common fund”).154 If the settlement compen-
sated class members without paying counsel, it would unjustly enrich
them at counsel’s expense.155 Yet, this doctrine assumes that claimants
implicitly consent to fee awards and count as passive beneficiaries,
which is not the case in multidistrict litigation where active plaintiffs
retain their own attorneys and have no ability to exit the multidistrict
litigation.156 As the Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust
Enrichment plainly states: “By comparison with class actions, court-
imposed fees to appointed counsel in consolidated litigation cannot be
explained entirely by restitution principles, since litigants may have no
choice but to accept and pay for certain legal services as directed by
the court.”157
Still, the common-fund doctrine’s underlying rationale is attrac-
tive: When lead lawyers perform the work for individually retained
attorneys, they benefit them. Failing to pay lead lawyers could thus
unjustly enrich non-lead attorneys, particularly free riders who simply
(E.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., No.
M:05-CV-01699-CRB, MDL 1699, 2006 WL 471782, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2006); see
also Eldon E. Fallon, Common Benefit Fees in Multidistrict Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 371,
375–76 (2014) (discussing the common-fund doctrine’s application in class actions and its
migration into the multidistrict litigation context).
154 See Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980) (“The common-fund
doctrine reflects the traditional practice in courts of equity, and it stands as a well-
recognized exception to the general principle that requires every litigant to bear his own
attorney’s fees.” (citations omitted)); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 29 cmt. c (2011) (“Class counsel assumes for this purpose the role of
restitution claimant; the restitution claim is asserted by the counsel against the class.
Counsel asserts that the class will be unjustly enriched, at counsel’s expense, unless a
reasonable fee is awarded from the common fund.”); Charles Silver, A Restitutionary
Theory of Attorneys’ Fees in Class Actions, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 663–66 (1991)
(arguing that restitution principles justify forcing absent plaintiffs to pay attorneys who
represent plaintiffs’ classes).
155 Boeing, 444 U.S. at 478 (“The [common-fund] doctrine rests on the perception that
persons who obtain the benefit of a lawsuit without contributing to its cost are unjustly
enriched at the successful litigant’s expense.”); see also Case v. Cont’l Airlines Corp., 974
F.2d 1345, 1992 WL 201080, at *2–4 (10th Cir. 1992) (unpublished table decision)
(overruling the imposition of PSC fees where plaintiffs experienced no traceable benefits
from the committee’s work); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 29 cmt. c (“The contingent nature of the class action fee—the fact that a
fee is payable only in the event of success, and then only by deduction from the recovery—
obviates most of the potential threat of forced exchange.”); Curtis & Resnik, supra note
69, at 427 (noting that the common fund “began in the nineteenth century when courts
recognized that individual plaintiffs and their attorneys might, by virtue of victorious
litigation, confer a benefit on third parties”).
156 Silver & Miller, supra note 13, at 124–27.
157 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 29 cmt. c.
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wait for lead lawyers to negotiate a proposed settlement.158 Moreover,
a non-lead attorney’s retainer agreement assumes that she will com-
plete the work and thus pays her a contingent fee.159 But she’s no
longer doing most of the work.160 Of course, this isn’t due to neglect
on her part; it’s the result of a changed procedural environment. The
question is whether that change creates compensable fees on a restitu-
tionary basis, or noncompensable spillover effects.161
Thus enters the second but related doctrine: contract law. The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts suggests that a contract such as a
retainer agreement can be discharged if “a party’s principal purpose is
substantially frustrated without his fault by the occurrence of an event
the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the con-
tract was made.”162 Like the common fund, this doctrine’s initial
attractiveness is apparent, but ultimately translates poorly into mul-
tidistrict litigation. First, the client’s principal purpose in hiring her
attorney is for the attorney to satisfactorily resolve her case.163 Yet,
appointing lead lawyers frustrates the retainer agreement’s purpose
by putting the client’s case into the lead lawyers’ hands.164 Second, the
158 In re Nineteen Appeals, 982 F.2d at 606 (“[S]tony adherence to the American rule
invites a serious free-rider problem. . . . [E]ach attorney, rather than toiling for the
common good and bearing the cost alone, will have an incentive to rely on others to do the
needed work, letting those others bear all the costs . . . .”).
159 See Walitalo v. Iacocca, 968 F.2d 741, 749 (8th Cir. 1992) (“A problem does arise,
however, if individual counsel entered a contingency agreement with his or her client on
the assumption that individual counsel would perform all work associated with the case
and that the agreed-upon fee would constitute the only fee for this work. Given that . . .
lead and liaison counsel are being separately compensated for this work, these contingency
fee arrangements may no longer be reasonable.”).
160 Id.; cf. In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No.
05-1708, 2008 WL 682174, at *19 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008) (“[A]lthough the fee
arrangements may have been fair when the individual litigations were commenced, the
Court concludes that many of the fee arrangements are likely not fair now because of the
common benefit work and economies of scale . . . .”).
161 See infra notes 314–17 and accompanying text (discussing noncompensable
externalities versus compensable work).
162 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 (1981).
163 See id. § 265 cmt. a (emphasizing that the frustrated purpose must have been a
principal one for the party making the contract); 30 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A.
LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 77:94 (4th ed. 2004) (noting that one of
the conditions for deeming a contractual obligation dischargeable under the “doctrines of
impracticability and frustration” is whether the frustrated purpose was “a principal
purpose of that party in making the contract”).
164 See In re Air Crash Disaster at Fla. Everglades on December 29, 1972, 549 F.2d 1006,
1019 n.17 (5th Cir. 1977) (“In a case like the one before us the lead counsel are not free to
strike their own bargains but work under the court’s order.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 265 cmt. a (requiring that the principal purpose of a contract be frustrated
before the impracticability doctrine applies); WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 163, § 77:94
(requiring that “the frustration must be substantial” before a judge should deem a contract
impracticable).
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client, having little legal knowledge, may not contemplate the possi-
bility that someone other than her attorney would litigate her case
without her consent.165 So, “without the default of either party, [the]
contractual obligation becomes incapable of performance because the
circumstances . . . render it a thing radically different from the under-
taking contemplated by the contract.”166 But the remedy is to dis-
charge the contractual duty to pay. And transferee judges do not
discharge contingent fees; they essentially reform the contract and
institute the bargain they think the parties would have reached. While
judges can reform agreements if they fail to reflect the parties’ true
agreement,167 or if there has been a mutual or unilateral mistake,168
multidistrict litigation fits neither category.
Finally, transferee judges have cited their “inherent managerial
authority” or “inherent equitable authority” as authorizing them to
compensate lead attorneys.169 They rationalize that the power to con-
solidate and manage complex litigation as well as the authority to
appoint lead lawyers “necessarily implies a corollary authority to . . .
compensate them for their work.”170 This power, they claim, somehow
derives from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42, which allows courts
to consolidate actions and “issue any other orders to avoid unneces-
sary cost or delay.”171 But relying on this authority as a stopgap mea-
sure when positive law cannot be identified risks violating the Rules
Enabling Act.172 As such, inherent authority appears to have no
165 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 cmt. a (noting that the party
must not have assumed that the frustrating event would have occurred); WILLISTON &
LORD, supra note 163, § 77:94.
166 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 163, § 77:94.
167 See, e.g., Lumpkins v. CSL Locksmith, LLC, 911 A.2d 418, 423–24 (D.C. 2006) (“The
governing law is that, ‘where an agreement has been reached by the parties but the writing
does not accurately express [their] mutual agreement . . . reformation is appropriate.’”
(alterations in original) (quoting Isaac v. First Nat’l Bank, 647 A.2d 1159, 1162 n.9 (D.C.
1994))).
168 Soults Farms, Inc. v. Schafer, 797 N.W.2d 92, 108–09 (Iowa 2011) (“Where there has
been a mistake . . . in the expression of the contract, reformation is the proper remedy.”).
169 E.g., In re Air Crash, 549 F.2d at 1017; In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 802 F. Supp.
2d 740, 770–71 (E.D. La. 2011); In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 2010 WL 716190, at
*4 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 24, 2010).
170 In re Vioxx, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 770; see also In re Air Crash, 549 F.2d at 1016 (“The
court’s power is illusory if it is dependent upon lead counsel’s performing the duties
desired of them for no additional compensation.”).
171 FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a); see, e.g., In re Air Crash, 549 F.2d at 1013–15 (noting that Rule
42 confers “a broad grant of authority, particularly in the last clause”). Rule 42, however,
speaks to consolidations under that rule, not to coordinated pretrial handling under § 1407,
unless the judge also orders consolidation.
172 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012) (requiring that rules of procedure not “abridge,
enlarge, or modify any substantive right,” a stricture potentially violated by the use of Rule
42(a) to order plaintiffs to compensate lead lawyers).
\\jciprod01\productn\n\nyu\90-1\nyu102.txt unknown Seq: 36 30-MAR-15 8:32
106 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:71
limits: It is guided by neither consent nor contract principles and
swells to fill whatever role it must, sacrificing transparency, predict-
ability, and restraint in its wake.
Adding to this doctrinal patchwork, judges invoke these ratio-
nales at different litigation stages and depend on various means for
implementing them. They have asked special masters173 and commit-
tees of attorneys174 to recommend fees, but the recent trend has been
to require attorneys to sign fee-transfer agreements at the beginning
of litigation.175 Fee-transfer agreements (and most allocation systems)
depend on the court creating a fund, which taxes plaintiffs’ gross mon-
etary recovery—usually between 2% and 6%—and places the money
in an interest-bearing account to be divvied up among the lead law-
yers.176 Like the nebulous rationales supporting them, the percentages
are arbitrary.177 Most judges do not explain their chosen percent-
ages,178 and when they do, they cite the piecemeal theories just men-
tioned,179 previous multidistrict litigation assessments, or proposals
from the steering committee—none of which have a dependable theo-
retical mooring.
In theory, fee-transfer agreements and fee provisions in settle-
ments buttress tenuous doctrinal rationales by lending a veneer of
173 E.g., In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 490–91 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)
(“[T]he four settlement special masters were directed to consult with the parties in order to
arrive at a recommended fee schedule cap and allocation of expenses.”).
174 See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657 (E.D. La. Nov. 20, 2007)
(Pretrial Order No. 32) (appointing a fee-allocation committee).
175 See, e.g., In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., No.
M:05-CV-01699-CRB, 2006 WL 471782, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2006) (assessing 4% of
the gross monetary recovery, 2% for fees and 2% for costs); In re Guidant Defibrillators
Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1705, slip op. at 2–4 (D. Minn. Feb. 15, 2006) (Pretrial
Order No. 6) (same); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657, slip op. at 3 (E.D. La.
Aug. 4, 2005) (Pretrial Order No. 19) (assessing 3% of the gross monetary recovery, 2% for
fees and 1% for costs, but noting that the 2% for fees comes from individual attorneys’ fee
contracts whereas the assessment for costs comes from the clients’ portion of the recovery).
176 E.g., In re Bextra, 2006 WL 471782, at *8; In re Guidant Defibrillators Prods. Liab.
Litig., MDL No. 05-1705, slip op. at 2–4 (D. Minn. Feb. 15, 2006) (Pretrial Order No. 6); In
re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657, slip op. at 1, 3 (E.D. La. Aug. 4, 2005) (Pretrial
Order No. 19); In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00 CIV. 2843(LAK), 2002 WL 441342,
at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2002). For average amounts of fee awards, see William B.
Rubenstein, On What a “Common Benefit Fee” Is, Is Not, and Should Be, 3 CLASS ACTION
ATT’Y FEE DIG. 87, 90 (2009) (examining twenty-one reported cases using common-benefit
fees and finding that almost all courts had assessed these fees between 4% and 6%).
177 See Dubay, supra note 57, at 42 (noting that courts seem to select assessment rates
arbitrarily based on prior litigation and suggestions from plaintiffs’ steering committees).
178 E.g., In re St. Jude Medical, Inc., No. MDL 1396, 2002 WL 1774232, at *2 (D. Minn.
Aug. 1, 2002); In re Rezulin, 2002 WL 441342, at *1.
179 E.g., In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No.
05-1708 (DWF/AJB), 2008 WL 682174, at *4–5 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008).
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coherence and consent to an unruly legal minefield.180 Fee-transfer
agreements often contain recitals that mimic consideration, such as
“Participating Attorneys are desirous of acquiring the PSC Work
Product and establishing an amicable, working relationship with the
PSC for the mutual benefit of their clients,” so they intend “to be
legally bound hereby” and “agree” to certain assessments.181 Simi-
larly, when lead lawyers embed fee provisions within settlements,182
they impart a consensual pretense even though the “settlement” may
actually be a contract between plaintiffs’ attorneys and the defendant
that requires attorneys to recommend the deal to their clients or with-
draw from representing them.183 Consenting attorneys receive their
contingent fee, minus lead lawyers’ fees, only after enough clients
agree.184 Instead of chastising attorneys for self-dealing or holding
them in contempt of court for undermining previous common-fund
orders, judges appear to embrace these “consensual” settlement mea-
sures by increasing lead lawyers’ fees in accordance with the
settlement.185
Of course, as in many contracts of adhesion, there is little genuine
consent involved in accepting either fee-transfer agreements or settle-
ments with embedded fees. Fee-transfer agreements are standardized
forms, presented by those with superior bargaining power (the court
and the steering committee) to attorneys with pending cases in the
multidistrict litigation who effectively have no choice but to accept
them.186 Attorneys cannot conduct discovery on their own, so they
180 See Curtis & Resnik, supra note 69, at 437 (“[U]nless retainer agreements are
modified in advance of or upon the creation of a PSC, no client has agreed by contract to
pay the costs of aggregation . . . .”).
181 In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., No. M:05-CV-
01699-CRB, 2006 WL 471782, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2006) (Pretrial Order No. 8).
182 See, e.g., In re Guidant, 2008 WL 682174, at *12 (“[A] common benefit payment
from the Settlement Fund is expressly contemplated by the terms of the MSA. Thus, even
if there was an agreement previously to utilize a straight assessment at 2% + 2%, the terms
of the MSA contracted around it.”); see also Silver & Miller, supra note 13, at 132–33
(critiquing the Guidant fee award).
183 E.g., Settlement Agreement Between Merck & Co., Inc. and the Counsel Listed on
the Signature Pages Hereto § 1.2.8.1 (Nov. 9, 2007), available at  http://
www.officialvioxxsettlement.com/documents/Master%20Settlement%20Agreement%20-
%20new.pdf.
184 See id. § 11.1.1–.4 (specifying that Merck can terminate the settlement if not enough
clients agree, resulting in no client or attorney receiving a payout).
185 See, e.g., In re Guidant, 2008 WL 682174, at *4 (increasing the common cost award to
the PSC to $10 million, which is greater than the original common fund envisioned); In re
Guidant Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1705 (D. Minn. Feb. 15, 2006)
(Pretrial Order No. 6) (creating original common fund structure for Guidant litigation).
186 See Silver & Miller, supra note 13, at 132–35 (describing the forced fee transfers
from claimants to lead attorneys that the latter can extract because of the bargaining power
differentials between them and non-lead attorneys). Although one can debate the merits of
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have few options but to use the common work product unless they
remain solely in state courts.
Even state-court attorneys find it difficult to evade the fee agree-
ment since federal judges use both carrots and sticks to encourage
participation. For instance, if they agree, state counsel may receive
and use the common-benefit work product, but if not, they are for-
bidden from receiving both the work product and any common-
benefit fees, even if their efforts benefitted the plaintiffs as a whole
through winning trial verdicts, for example.187
Similarly, there is little true consent when lead lawyers negotiate
settlement offers that require plaintiffs’ law firms to tender their
entire client inventory or continue litigating in front of a judge who
promoted and then publicly blessed the deal.188 Were those circum-
stances not cause enough for concern, some judges have even allowed
lead lawyers to increase the fees set forth in initial fee-transfer agree-
ments by upping the percentage through a later settlement.189
In Guidant, Vioxx, and the Genetically Modified Rice Litigation,
the lead lawyers negotiating the settlement inserted provisions into
the global agreement increasing their fee and requiring settling plain-
tiffs to waive their objections if they wanted to enroll.190 In addition to
the lack of genuine consent, this is troubling for the plain risk of struc-
tural collusion it presents by giving defendants some control over lead
lawyers’ fees. As Professors Silver and Miller point out, “The defen-
dant is happy to offer [lead attorneys] ‘red-carpet treatment on fees’—
higher common benefit fees cost the defendant nothing—in return for
other things, such as a smaller settlement fund, a later funding date, or
adhesive contracts, there is something particularly troubling about them when they are
promulgated by and enforced by the judiciary. See infra notes 338–40 and accompanying
text (discussing the need for courts not to facilitate or assist exploitative action).
187 In re Chantix (Varenicline) Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2092, slip op. at 4–5 (N.D.
Ala. June 2, 2010) (Pretrial Order No. 7). Similarly, to encourage early cooperation, some
federal judges penalize latecomers by taxing them at a higher rate. Id. at 7–8 (assessing a
6% fee for early participating counsel and an 8% fee for later participating counsel); In re
Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., No. M:05-CV-01699-CRB,
MDL 1699, 2006 WL 471782, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2006) (Pretrial Order No. 8)
(assessing 2% as fees and 2% as costs for counsel who participate within ninety days of the
court’s order and an amount that “shall exceed the 4% assessment under the full
participation option” for those who participate after ninety days).
188 See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Group Consensus, Individual Consent, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 506, 513 (2011) (describing how critics described the settlement offer as
coercive).
189 See In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-
1708 (DWF/AJB), 2008 WL 682174, at *11–14 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008) (increasing the
common-benefit fee specified in the form agreements from 4% to 15% of the settlement);
Silver & Miller, supra note 13, at 132–35 (criticizing this practice).
190 Supra notes 42–47 and accompanying text.
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a higher participation threshold.”191 Thus, allowing lead lawyers to
compensate themselves via settlement suggests collusion, not consent,
and should be judicially reprimanded as self-dealing because it vio-
lates lead lawyers’ fiduciary obligation to their principals.192
2. Capping Contingent Fees
Capping private contingent-fee contracts is perhaps the most con-
troversial emerging judicial practice in multidistrict litigation.193
Although this Article’s empirical evidence on repeat players suggests
that a limited market may exist that could lead to inflated fees,194
some judges have taken fee awards into their own hands without
sound justification. Specifically, some judges have awarded lead law-
yers a percentage of the total settlement amount, capped non-lead
attorneys’ contingent fees, and based those capped percentages on the
already reduced settlement amount.195 So, depending on the calcula-
tion method,196 a non-lead attorney initially entitled to 33% of a $1
million award, who must allocate 8% of that total award to lead law-
191 Silver & Miller, supra note 13, at 134.
192 See Silver, supra note 47, at 1990 (arguing that, as fiduciaries to all the plaintiffs and
the “disabled lawyers,” lead attorneys should not use “their control of settlement
negotiations to enrich themselves at disabled lawyers’ expense” but could “[enrich
themselves] by increasing claimants’ recoveries”); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 469 (1958) (“An agent is entitled to no compensation for conduct which is
disobedient or which is a breach of his duty of loyalty . . . .”).
193 E.g., Aimee Lewis, Limiting Justice: The Problem of Judicially Imposed Caps on
Contingent Fees in Mass Actions, 31 REV. LITIG. 209 (2012); Morris A. Ratner, Achieving
Procedural Goals Through Indirection: The Use of Ethics Doctrine to Justify Contingency
Fee Caps in MDL Aggregate Settlements, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 59 (2013); Silver &
Miller, supra note 13, at 136–41; Jeremy Hays, Note, The Quasi-Class Action Model for
Limiting Attorneys’ Fees in Multidistrict Litigation, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 589, 591
n.9 (2012). Although commentators have only recently begun to explore the issue in depth,
fee capping occurred in the early 1990s in the San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation.
See No. MDL-721, 1993 WL 564466, at *2 (D.P.R. Nov. 24, 1993) (“The Court has already
modified these contingent fee agreements once, imposing a ceiling of twenty-five percent
(25%) for minor and incompetent plaintiffs and thirty-three percent (33%) for all other
plaintiffs.”), rev’d on other grounds, 56 F.3d 295 (1st Cir. 1995).
194 But see Silver & Miller, supra note 13, at 137–38 (“[L]awyers compete for clients in
competitive markets.”). One expert concluded that “market failure was not a practical
possibility.” Id. at 138.
195 E.g., In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No.
05-1708 (DWF/AJB), 2008 WL 682174, at *19 n.30 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008); In re Zyprexa
Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 496–97 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). In Vioxx, however, Judge
Fallon capped all lawyers’ fees at 32% and initially allocated 8% of that amount to lead
lawyers. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 760 F. Supp. 2d 640, 645 (E.D. La. 2010); In re
Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 607 & n.1 (E.D. La. 2008).
196 There are several methods for calculating fees:
(1) 20% of $1,000,000 = $200,000 as the total fee. 8% of that $200,000 fee = $16,000 in
common-benefit fees. Therefore, lead lawyers would receive $16,000 and individual
counsel would receive $184,000.
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yers (as Judge Fallon charged in Vioxx) and whose fee is then capped
at 20% of the remaining settlement (as Judge Frank attempted to do
in Guidant),197 might receive $184,000 as opposed to $330,000—a sig-
nificant reduction.
Reducing fees gained momentum when Judge Weinstein capped
privately retained attorneys’ fees at 35% in Zyprexa.198 Although he
cited a variety of doctrines ranging from class-action analogies to
ethics, the real basis for his decision appears to have been a general
concern about public perception and a specific concern about Zyprexa
plaintiffs, who were “both mentally and physically ill and . . . largely
without power or knowledge to negotiate fair fees.”199
Other courts, however, have overlooked Judge Weinstein’s con-
cern about legal incapacity and focused on plaintiffs’ physical impair-
ments and public perception.200 In Guidant, for example, Judge Frank
capped all contingent fees at 20%, with the caveat that special masters
could adjust them upward “to a maximum of either 33.33%, the per-
centage previously agreed to in the individual cases . . . , or the limit
imposed by state law, whichever of the three is less.”201 This meant
that some lawyers whose clients had agreed to a 40% fee received
28% of their client’s gross recovery.202 Building on Zyprexa and
Guidant, in the Vioxx litigation, Judge Fallon capped individual attor-
(2) 20% of $1,000,000 = $200,000 as the total fee. 8% of $1,000,000 = $80,000, which is
the common-benefit fee. Therefore, lead lawyers would receive $80,000 and individual
counsel would receive $120,000 ($200,000 – $80,000 = $120,000).
(3) 8% of $1,000,000 = $80,000, which is the common-benefit fee. $1,000,000 – $80,000
= $920,000 net after the common-benefit fee is extracted. 20% of that $920,000 = $184,000;
thus individual counsel receives $184,000.
The numbers that follow in this sentence are based on the third method. Courts have
used a combination of these methods to award fees. Sources cited supra note 195.
197 See Silver & Miller, supra note 13, at 136–37 (discussing those fee awards).
198 In re Zyprexa, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 491 (allowing special masters to vary caps upwards
to 37.5% and downwards to 30%). There are some instances of earlier fee caps, however,
in the bankruptcy context and in the breast implant litigation. E.g., In re Silicone Gel
Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV 92-P-10000-S., Civ. A. No. CV94-P-11558-S.,
MDL No. 926, 1994 WL 114580, at *4 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 1, 1994) (capping fees at 25%); In re
A.H. Robins Co., 182 B.R. 128, 138–39 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995) (capping compensation at
10% of claimants’ pro rata payments).
199 In re Zyprexa, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 491.
200 See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 560–61 (E.D. La. 2009)
(justifying efforts to ensure that contingent-fee awards were fair and consistent by noting
that many plaintiffs were physically ill and elderly); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 574 F.
Supp. 2d 606, 613 (E.D. La. 2008) (same); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators
Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708 (DWF/AJB), 2008 WL 682174, at *17–18 (D. Minn.
Mar. 7, 2008) (discussing the need to prevent contingency fees from appearing abusive or
harming the public’s perception of the legal profession).
201 In re Guidant, 2008 WL 682174, at *19.
202 In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708
(DWF/AJB), 2008 WL 3896006, at *8, 10 (D. Minn. Aug. 21, 2008).
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neys’ contingent fees at 32% plus reasonable costs.203 Finally, in the
Ground Zero workers’ litigation against New York City, Judge
Hellerstein simply ruled that he would not approve a settlement with
a one-third contingent fee, cut plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees from the con-
tractual amount of 33% to 25%, and prohibited them from charging
clients some $6.1 million in interest costs from third-party financing.204
Although Judge Fallon and Judge Frank both echoed Judge
Weinstein’s apprehensiveness over public perception and cited his
quasi-class-action analogy,205 nothing about the plaintiffs in either
Vioxx or Guidant suggested that they were mentally unfit to negotiate
their own fees.206 Also like Judge Weinstein, Judge Fallon and Judge
Frank identified a generic concern about the inherent conflicts
between claimants and their attorneys in contingent-fee cases.207 Yet,
those arguments do not support an across-the-board fee cap where
plaintiffs possess the legal capacity to enter into binding contracts.
First, while it is true that courts have been more cautious when it
comes to contingent fees than billable hours,208 judges should have
203 In re Vioxx, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 556 (instituting the cap but noting that “extraordinary
circumstances may exist which could warrant a departure (in either direction) from the
32% cap in individual cases”); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 617
(E.D. La. 2008).
204 In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 879 F. Supp. 2d 396, 403 n.29 (S.D.N.Y.
2012); In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., Nos. 21 MC 100(AKH), 21 MC 103, 2010
WL 4683610, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2010) (“Plaintiffs’ counsel may charge no more than
a 25 percent contingent fee, with expenses limited in accordance with previous orders,
rulings, and agreements.”); Mark Hamblett, Plaintiffs’ Lawyers in 9/11 Cases Lose Bid to
Recoup Interest Costs, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 30, 2010, at 1; Mireya Navarro, Terms Met, Payout
Rises for Workers at 9/11 Site, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2011, at A28.
205 In re Vioxx, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 611–13; In re Guidant Corp. Implantable
Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708, 2008 WL 682174, at *17 (D. Minn.
Mar. 7, 2008). Concern about public perception stems from the high-profile nature of these
cases and the significant media attention that results. See, e.g., supra note 1 (listing
newspaper stories about multidistrict litigation).
206 Judge Fallon suggested that Vioxx plaintiffs were vulnerable because of their
advanced age and alleged personal injuries, but never stated they were mentally unfit. In re
Vioxx, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 560 (“[L]ike the elderly and physically ill claimants in Zyprexa
and Guidant, Vioxx claimants have all suffered some form of physical injury and many are
elderly.”).
207 In re Vioxx, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 611; In re Guidant, 2008 WL 682174, at *17.
208 Rather than affording them the usual hands-off approach typically reserved for fee
contracts under the American rule, judges closely scrutinize contingent fees because they
give attorneys an interest in the litigation’s outcome. See Allen v. United States, 606 F.2d
432, 435 (4th Cir. 1979) (“The district courts’ supervisory jurisdiction over contingent fee
contracts for services rendered in cases before them is well-established.”); WILLISTON &
LORD, supra note 163, § 62:9 (noting that courts “closely scrutinize” contingent-fee
arrangements). Still, the only metric courts use in scrutinizing these contracts is whether
the percentage is unreasonable—the award does not correlate with the value provided by
the attorney. If the fee is unreasonable, then courts either change the calculation formula
or use quantum meruit to award a fee. See, e.g., Wunschel Law Firm, P.C. v. Clabaugh, 291
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some exceptional reason before interfering with private contracts
when plaintiffs are physically ill or elderly, but mentally fit.
Farmington Dowel, which Judge Frank and Judge Weinstein cited in
support of their decisions,209 involved extreme circumstances: A com-
petent adult agreed to pay counsel one-third of his trebled antitrust
damages plus the judicially determined amount awarded as a “reason-
able attorney’s fee” under section 4 of the Sherman Act.210 In ren-
dering its decision, the First Circuit distinguished between its role
under section 4 and its ethical, supervisory power, noting that the
latter “is reserved for exceptional circumstances” and “requires [the
court] to arrive at a figure which it considers the outer limit of reason-
ableness.”211 Rosquist, the other main case that Judge Weinstein cited,
involved a situation in which the court appointed a guardian ad litem
to protect orphaned minors.212 Neither case justifies uniformly cap-
ping private contingent fees where mentally and legally competent
adults assent to the arrangement.213
Second, despite repeated citations to the contrary, there is no
such thing as a quasi-class action: A class is either certified or not.214
Treating Rule 23 as a grab bag of authority to be invoked when conve-
nient undermines the Rule’s due-process protections and structural
assurances of fairness.215 When judges cite the “quasi-class action” to
justify cutting attorneys’ fees, they risk lending an air of legitimacy to
the case’s outcome even though they have not subjected it to Rule
23’s rigors.216
N.W. 2d 331, 337 (Iowa 1980) (suggesting that, where a contingent-fee arrangement was
void on public-policy grounds, the law firm could still recover under quantum meruit);
WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 163, § 62:9 (“Where the contingent fee is held to be
unreasonable, the court may either change the formula for calculating the fee, or award a
fee based on quantum merit.”).
209 In re Guidant, 2008 WL 682174, at *18 n.29.
210 Farmington Dowel Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61, 90–91 (1st Cir. 1969).
211 Id. at 90; see also infra note 340 and accompanying text (noting courts’ self-regarding
concerns).
212 Rosquist v. Soo Line R.R., 692 F.2d 1107, 1109 (7th Cir. 1982).
213 See Ratner, supra note 193, at 81–83 (surveying cases cited by MDL courts which
cap contingency fees in cases involving protection of incompetents).
214 See Mullenix, supra note 9, at 389 (arguing that there is “no such thing as a quasi-
class action”). But see Weinstein, supra note 33, at 480–81 (describing types of mass torts as
“in effect quasi-class actions”).
215 See Mullenix, supra note 9, at 390 (noting the due-process protection for absent class
members in Rule 23).
216 See Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279–80 (7th Cir. 2002) (“We
and other courts have gone so far as to term the district judge in the settlement phase of a
class action suit a fiduciary of the class, who is subject therefore to the high duty of care
that the law requires of fiduciaries.”); Mullenix, supra note 9, at 397–400 (criticizing Judge
Weinstein’s characterization of the suit in Zyprexa as a quasi-class action).
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Third, when judges use their “inherent authority” or “general
equitable powers”217 to police individual attorneys’ contingent fees,
they must still tether that authority to a normative framework that
dictates when a fee is reasonable.218 The Model Rules of Professional
Conduct and most states’ ethics rules contemplate a context-specific
inquiry that considers factors such as customary fees in particular
locations; time, labor, and skill required; results obtained; attorneys’
experience and reputation; and attorneys’ opportunity costs in
accepting the matter.219 Yet, courts that have dubbed fees excessive
across-the-board and capped them accordingly220 have shied away
from identifying the applicable ethics code or conducting choice-of-
law inquiries that pinpoint which state’s ethics rules apply to which
attorneys.221
Finally, conflicting interests exist between attorneys and clients in
all contingent-fee cases, not just in multidistrict litigation. While
judges may have inherent authority to regulate unreasonable fees,222
and contingency fees are treated with special care,223 if concern over
contingent fees alone were enough to justify routine judicial review,
217 See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 554 (E.D. La. 2009)
(recognizing the court’s “inherent authority”); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F.
Supp. 2d 488, 491 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (describing the court’s authority as “general equitable
powers”).
218 See Judith A. McMorrow, The (F)Utility of Rules: Regulating Attorney Conduct in
Federal Court Practice, 58 SMU L. REV. 3, 22 (2005) (noting that a court’s inherent powers
are meant to supplement the federal rules, but that states’ ethical rules; the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Evidence; the Rules of Professional Conduct;
and norms of conduct established within the bar should frame judicial expectations);
Ratner, supra note 193, at 77–78 (discussing the Vioxx, Guidant, and Zyprexa courts’
reliance on normative frameworks in policing contingency fees).
219 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a) (1991); Ratner, supra note 193, at 78.
220 Judge Frank eventually rejected the special masters’ proposal that he cap fees at 25%
across the board in favor of “the lesser of the contractual fee, the state-imposed fee limit,
or 37.18 percent of the client’s gross recovery.” Silver & Miller, supra note 13, at 137.
221 See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d at 559 (citing the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct and cases from multiple jurisdictions, but not identifying
which states’ laws governed which attorneys’ fees); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable
Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708 (DWF/AJB), 2008 WL 682174, at *18
(D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008) (citing cases from multiple jurisdictions that capped excessive fees
and relying on ethics principles without identifying a particular rule); In re Zyprexa Prods.
Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d at 492 (discussing general supervisory powers but not
pinpointing specific ethical codes or provisions).
222 This has been questioned. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal
Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 776–79 (2001) (quoting
Justice Kennedy and arguing that statutes and rules limit courts’ inherent powers).
223 See Ratner, supra note 193, at 77–78 (discussing treatment of contingency fees in
Vioxx, Guidant, and Zyprexa). The Model Rules of Professional Conduct explicitly except
contingent fees from the general ban on a lawyer assuming an interest in the litigation and
subject them to multiple safeguards. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(c),
1.8(e)(1).
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then nearly every personal-injury action in the country would demand
scrutiny.
Judges’ disquiet over fees may stem from two rationales. First,
they are accustomed to awarding plaintiffs’ attorneys class-action fees,
which average around 20% of the class award.224 In comparison, a
33% (or more) contingent fee may seem excessive. Second, because
attorneys benefit from the cost savings that economies of scale
engender, judges reason that this discount should be passed on to
plaintiffs lest their attorneys receive a windfall.225 Reduced costs
result from both lead lawyers’ efforts and aggregation in general. But
once judges extract lead lawyers’ fees from individual attorneys’ fees,
aggregation is the only cost-saving rationale that hasn’t been taken
into account.
The cost savings from aggregating clients is not an independent
reason to reduce fees. Attorneys routinely aggregate cases and clients
outside of multidistrict litigation. And lawyers who specialize in a par-
ticular area often recycle their work to benefit new clients—but they
typically do not discount their fees. Rather, the aggregation benefits
clients by creating leverage against the defendant, and the recycled
work product may encapsulate years of attorney expertise. So, what
judges in multidistrict litigation deem cost-saving measures might
ordinarily be seen as the justifiable price for expertise, experience,
and leverage.
Likewise, the cost savings generated by aggregating cases and
appointing lead lawyers may not save individual attorneys as much as
courts anticipate. When contrasted with class actions, multidistrict liti-
gation contains additional risks and expenses for individual attorneys:
They must advertise, recruit, screen, and interact with many clients (as
opposed to just named representatives); develop the history and facts
surrounding each client’s claim to prove specific causation; keep cli-
ents informed of the litigation’s progress; and counsel clients on when
and whether to settle.226 Each activity significantly increases attor-
224 Supra note 149.
225 See, e.g., In re Nineteen Appeals Arising out of San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire
Litig., 982 F.2d 603, 606 (1st Cir. 1992) (“A court supervising mass disaster litigation may
intervene to prevent or minimize an incipient free-rider problem and, to that end, may
employ measures reasonably calculated to avoid ‘unjust enrichment of persons who benefit
from a lawsuit without shouldering its costs.’” (quoting Catullo v. Metzner, 834 F.2d 1075,
1083 (1st Cir. 1987))).
226 In the Dupont Plaza Hotel fire litigation, individually retained attorneys who were
not on the plaintiffs’ steering committee argued that the district court judge greatly
undervalued their contribution to individual clients. Id. at 607–08.
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neys’ administrative burden and staffing costs.227 Yet, client recruit-
ment helps amplify settlement pressure and thereby contributes to the
group’s collective good—a factor that receives little attention when
judges cap fees.228 So, while it may be true that particular attorneys
stand to receive a windfall, that would be nearly impossible to deter-
mine without considering each attorney’s opportunity costs, sunk
costs, and contribution to plaintiffs’ overall outcome. Capping fees
uniformly places the burden on objecting attorneys to demonstrate
extraordinary circumstances entitling them to their contractually
agreed upon fee.229
Finally, courts may not fully appreciate contingent fees’ insur-
ance-like dimension. What appears to be a windfall for individual
attorneys may actually reflect a gain in a much larger portfolio of risk
that funds not only the present litigation, but other cases too.230 Attor-
neys working on a contingent fee must diversify their cases and their
risk so that their “winnings” reflect the expense of litigating both suc-
cessful and unsuccessful cases.231 Put differently, without some big
wins, these attorneys may not be able to accept pro bono clients or
cases without clear liability.
In sum, while aggregating plaintiffs’ claims and appointing lead
lawyers streamlines certain aspects of the cases, litigating may not be
as economical as judges presume. And, while judges’ experience with
collusive settlements in the class-action context may justifiably prompt
concern over contingent fees, their involvement must have predictable
limits and quantifiable metrics. Reducing contingent fees should be
the exception, not the rule. If such a cap is warranted, then it should
be justified on an individual basis.
227 “[A]ttorneys in the Vioxx Litigation Consortium considered 30,000 potential clients
and accepted only 2000—a process which took a combined 1,601,150 hours by staff,
paralegals, attorneys, nurse practitioners, and medical experts at a cost of $13.5 million.”
Burch, supra note 16, at 1288.
228 See Silver & Miller, supra note 13, at 128–29 (describing the process of reviewing
potential claimants).
229 See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 556 (E.D. La. 2009)
(responding to the Vioxx Litigation Consortium’s objection to fees and observing that
“extraordinary circumstances may exist which could warrant a departure (in either
direction) from the 32% cap in individual cases”).
230 See KRITZER, supra note 112, at 10–19 (describing contingency-fee legal practice as
portfolio management); Burch, supra note 16, at 1290 (measuring litigation’s risks and
rewards like a portfolio, and noting that successful cases finance losing cases).
231 See KRITZER, supra note 112, at 17–19 (developing a formula to quantify the profits
in terms of risk in a contingent-fee practice).
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C. Approving Aggregate Settlements
Given their concern over attorneys’ fees and analogies to class
actions, judges’ interest in ostensibly private settlements is not sur-
prising. After all, settlement and fees go hand in hand, with some lead
lawyers negotiating their fee and the settlement in one fell swoop.232
Plus, the controversy over what many commentators view as meddling
in fee awards extends to settlement review,233 in part because judges
cite similar authority for both. Unlike class actions, in which Rule
23(e) requires judges to thoroughly assess whether the settlement is
fair, reasonable, and adequate, nonclass settlements like those in
Guidant,234 Zyprexa,235 Vioxx,236 and the World Trade Center Disaster
232 E.g., In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No.
05-1708 (DWF/AJB), 2008 WL 682174, at *4 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008) (“The [Master
Settlement Agreement] included a provision, section II.K, stating that the Court would
determine the amount of the Common Benefit Payment.”); see also Weinstein, supra note
10, at 529 (“In large class actions and other consolidated litigations, fees often determine
the shape of settlements.”); Judge Signs Off on Deal for Ground Zero Workers, NPR (June
10, 2010, 3:04 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=127746263
(observing that Judge Hellerstein rejected a previous settlement offer because the amount
was too small and attorneys’ fees were too large).
233 See, e.g., Grabill, supra note 9, at 175–78 (describing the connection between
settlement review in quasi-class actions and private mass-tort settlements); Rothman, supra
note 12, at 320–21 (discussing Judge Hellerstein’s review of settlement in In re World
Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation). But see Francis E. McGovern, A Proposed
Settlement Rule for Mass Torts, 74 UMKC L. REV. 623, 623 (2006) (arguing that a separate
judge should be appointed “to oversee efforts to achieve a global settlement of a mass
tort”).
234 In re Guidant, 2008 WL 682174, at *10 (“Through the extraordinary efforts of the
common benefit attorneys who contributed their time and skills, and advanced money to
fund this litigation, Plaintiffs’ counsel achieved a global settlement of $240,000,000.00 for
8,550 Plaintiffs. The Court notes that many of the individual cases likely are not strong
stand-alone cases.”).
235 Judge Weinstein set firm trial dates in the Zyprexa litigation to encourage settlement,
as many trial judges do. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1596, 2004 WL
2792123, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2004). But, once the parties reached an agreement in
principal, he also appointed Ken Feinberg, Michael Rozen, retired Judge John Trotter, and
Catherine Yanni as Settlement Masters to develop criteria for administering and evaluating
claims, gather necessary information, implement a settlement plan for valuing claims, and
mediate contested claims. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1596, 2005 WL
1939339, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2005); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1596,
2005 WL 2237824, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 30, 2005).
236 During a status conference in the Vioxx litigation, Judge Fallon convened judges with
the heaviest Vioxx dockets—Judge Higbee from New Jersey state court, Judge Chaney
from California state court, and Judge Wilson from Texas state court—along with
plaintiffs’ lead lawyers and defendants’ lead counsel, and jointly announced that the parties
should begin “serious settlement negotiations.” In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No.
1657, 2010 WL 724084, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 18, 2010); see also Susan Todd, Inside the Vioxx
Litigation, NJ.COM, (Nov. 18, 2007, 12:34 PM), http://blog.nj.com/business_impact/print
.html?entry=/2007/11/inside_the_vioxx_litigation.html (“Fallon, Higbee and Chaney met in
New Orleans. Over dinner they prepared for a meeting the next morning with attorneys
from both sides. It was time, the judges had decided, for the lawyers to discuss a
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Site Litigation237 are private agreements that parties presumably enter
voluntarily. Thus, the existence of a legal basis for policing a “volun-
tary” settlement between private parties is uncertain at best.
This uncertainty has prompted courts and commentators to take
two divergent views about judicial power in nonclass settlements. By
one view, unless the settlement itself authorizes the court to act,238
these judges have overstepped their authority and paternalistically
meddled with plaintiffs’ contractual ability.239 But this ignores the
realities of mass litigation, where plaintiffs have attenuated relation-
ships with their attorneys and their attorneys face powerful financial
temptations to achieve closure by pushing ethical boundaries and
coercing consent.240 For example, the private settlement that Judge
Hellerstein rejected in the litigation over injuries received while
cleaning up Ground Zero offered a close-knit community of
firefighters and police officers $575 million if 95% of them accepted,
but $657.5 million if 100% agreed.241 Even though Judge Hellerstein
acknowledged the settlement offer’s private nature, he was concerned
with attorney overreaching, public perception, transparency, and the
fairness of the amount itself.242
resolution.”). Once the lead lawyers reached a proposed settlement eleven months later,
the judges reconvened to jointly announce and informally “approve” the settlement
alongside the lead lawyers. See Transcript of Status Conference at 5, In re Vioxx Prods.
Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657 (E.D. La. Nov. 9, 2007), available at http://www.laed.uscourts
.gov/vioxx/Transcripts/11-9-07.pdf.
237 Infra notes 241–42 and accompanying text.
238 See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 552–53 & n.7 (E.D. La.
2009) (discussing the Vioxx Settlement Agreement).
239 See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, The Role of the Judge in Non-Class Settlements, 90
WASH. U. L. REV. 1015, 1024 (2013) (“Claims belong to claimants, not to the judge.”);
Grabill, supra note 9, at 127 (arguing that courts should avoid reviewing private mass-tort
settlements). In Vioxx, Judge Fallon noted, “the parties have done more than simply ask
the Court to approve a settlement agreement or move for a disbursement of funds. In fact,
this Court is expressly authorized to be the Chief Administrator of the Settlement
Agreement.” In re Vioxx, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 557.
240 See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text (discussing an example in the Vioxx
case).
241 Mireya Navarro, Judge Rejects Deal on Health Claims of Workers at Ground Zero,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2010, at A12; see also Alvin K. Hellerstein et al., Managerial Judging:
The 9/11 Responders’ Tort Litigation, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 127, 157–60 (2012) (reviewing
the history of the settlement).
242 Judge Hellerstein’s words are worth quoting:
Most settlements are private; a plaintiff and defendant come together,
shake hands, and it’s done with. Although the judge may look and see if there’s
some infant or some compromise or something else, basically it’s the parties
that decide. It’s the parties that grant the fee. The judge has no part in it.
This is different. This is 9/11. This is a special law of commons. This is a
case that’s dominated my docket, and because of that, I have the power of
review. If I don’t think it is fair, I’m going to tell you that, and you will make
the judgment how to deal with it.
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A second view credits the concerns Judge Hellerstein identified
and advocates extending the dubious “quasi-class action”243 label to
allow transferee judges to monitor large, private settlements as they
would class actions under Rule 23(e).244 On one hand, judicial
involvement, particularly through published opinions, enhances the
transparency and legitimacy of deals negotiated by self-interested
attorneys that occur with little client involvement, monitoring, or con-
sent. But on the other, judges have engaged with private settlements
to different degrees, and without clear limits or standards, there is less
predictability.245 Moreover, accepting the “quasi-class action” ration-
ale permits attorneys and judges to circumvent Rule 23’s certification
requirements, strip away its due-process protections, and cherry-pick
its convenient aspects while ignoring those that impede closure.246
Consequently, what is needed, and what Part III.C offers, is a
middle ground that permits some judicial oversight, but also cabins
judicial power. As that Part argues, compensating lead lawyers using a
quantum-meruit theory would require judges to assess the litigation’s
outcome to evaluate the case’s success and the lead lawyers’
contributions. This fee assessment thus provides a legitimate private-
law basis for appraising nonclass settlements.
III
RETHINKING BEST PRACTICES IN MULTIDISTRICT
LITIGATION
As evidenced thus far, multidistrict litigation places transferee
judges in uncharted territory, yet burdens them with enormous
Transcript of Status Conference at 54:14–24, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No.
21 MC 100 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2010); id. at 63:9–12 (“I want accountability. I want judicial
control over this process, because that’s what’s fair. If I’m the judge, I can be reversed. If
the parties appoint someone, he’s the dictator. We don’t have dictators.”); see also In re
World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 1:21-mc-00100-AKH (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2010),
ECF No. 2091 (approving the settlement agreement).
243 See Mullenix, supra note 9 (criticizing the use of “quasi-class actions”).
244 See Weinstein, supra note 10, at 529 (“In my view, consolidations should be treated
for some purposes as class actions to assure judicial review of fees and settlements.”).
245 Cf., e.g., supra notes 234–37 (discussing the Guidant, Zyprexa, Vioxx, and World
Trade Center settlements).
246 The predominance aspect is often the stumbling block for actual class certification.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring common questions of law or fact to predominate
over individual questions of law or fact); see also Mullenix, supra note 9, at 390–91, 394
(describing the use of quasi-class actions as an end run around Rule 23 requirements); cf.
McFarland v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. CIVA1:06CV466LTS-RHW, 2006 WL
3071988, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 25, 2006) (observing that it would be “inconsistent” to
“deny class certification . . . and at the same time allow [claims] to go forward in what the
Magistrate accurately described as a ‘quasi-class action lawsuit’ . . . without regard for the
rigid requirements for class certification.”).
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responsibility. While the Manual for Complex Litigation provides
judges with some guidance, it has not been updated since 2004 and
thus provides no guidance on many recent developments. Accord-
ingly, this Part suggests some substantive and procedural improve-
ments for the three principal areas Part II critiqued: appointing lead
lawyers, awarding those lawyers fees, and reviewing nonclass
settlements.
First, because dissent promotes adequate representation, thwarts
detrimental group decision-making biases, and encourages innovation,
judges should embrace avenues for changing the current norms that
silence objectors and pressure attorneys toward cooperation and con-
sensus. This can be achieved by designating lead lawyers to represent
plaintiffs’ various interests, inviting objections, and conducting eviden-
tiary hearings before choosing leaders. Second, compensating lead
counsel on a quantum-meruit basis could clarify the muddled doc-
trinal lineage that judges have previously cited and would reflect the
true nature of appointing lead lawyers, which is more akin to a forced
client referral than a common fund. Finally, if judges embrace the
quantum-meruit proposal, it would give them a legitimate basis to
assess how much lead lawyers benefitted the plaintiffs through the
results they achieved. Although this settlement review would be lim-
ited as compared with judicial review under Rule 23(e), conducting
that review in the context of awarding fees supplies a powerful incen-
tive against collusion.
A. Selection Criteria for Lead Lawyers
As Part II.A.2 demonstrated, transferee judges’ emphasis on
experience and financing abilities often results in appointing repeat
players to leadership positions. Although having some seasoned law-
yers in these roles may benefit plaintiffs,247 the danger is that coopera-
tive norms, reputational concerns, and conformity could lead to
inadequately representing clients whose best interests conflict with the
majority. Put plainly, when governing norms demand collaboration
and shun dissent, plaintiffs’ representation suffers.248
247 See Issacharoff, supra note 139, at 678 (“Through repeat confrontations with a
problem, errors that may trigger heuristic deficiencies in lay actors may be overcome, or at
least compensated for.”).
248 See Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Driving Forces Behind Informal
Sanctions, 73 ECONOMETRICA 2017 (2005) (finding that cooperating group members
impose the most severe sanctions on defectors and that retaliation is a driving factor
behind fairness-driven informal sanctions); Fehr & Fischbacher, supra note 113, at C2–C3
(arguing that reciprocal fairness shapes social preferences); Michael Schrage, Daniel
Kahneman: The Thought Leader Interview, 33 STRATEGY+BUS. 1, 4 (2003), http://
www.strategy-business.com/media/file/03409.pdf (describing the risk of polarization in
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Both judges and committees can take steps to combat these nega-
tive effects. If committee members each briefly summarized their
positions in writing, collected them confidentially, and only then dis-
cussed the issue, that process would crystallize positions and make
information known before leaders prompt others to fall in line behind
them.249
Judges can alleviate these concerns by adopting the following
strategies to select lead lawyers:
1. Cognitive Diversity, Dissent, and Group Decisions
Appointing a cognitively diverse leadership committee can
encourage dissent and increase innovation on certain disjunctive tasks
like identifying and cultivating successful legal arguments.250 Cogni-
tive diversity focuses on diverse knowledge and expertise as opposed
to identity diversity, which includes visible differences such as race,
ethnicity, age, gender, physical disabilities, and demographic
dissimilarities.251
Nevertheless, cognitive diversity is not as readily identifiable as
identity diversity because it comes directly from training and exper-
group dynamics). Reciprocity and reputational concerns, along with trustworthiness, are
most robust when people cooperate with one another over time in repeated interactions.
See Van Dijk et al., supra note 113, at 291–92 (describing the trend towards reciprocity in
public-good experiments).
249 See KAHNEMAN, supra note 110, at 245 (“This procedure makes better use of the
knowledge available to members of the group than the common practice of open
discussion.”).
250 See PAGE, supra note 65, at xiv–xv (discussing the advantages of diversity in groups).
251 Id. at 7–8; Karen A. Jehn et al., Why Differences Make a Difference: A Field Study of
Diversity, Conflict, and Performance in Workgroups, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 741, 756–60 (1999)
(describing the results of a study isolating value, ethnic, and social-category diversity);
Eden B. King et al., Conflict and Cooperation in Diverse Workgroups, 65 J. SOC. ISSUES
261, 267–68 (2009) (describing the shift away from identity diversity); Elizabeth Mannix &
Margaret A. Neale, What Differences Make a Difference? The Promise and Reality of
Diverse Teams in Organizations, 6 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INTEREST 31, 41–42 (2005)
(reviewing studies examining the effects of information-processing diversity in groups).
While identity diversity might occasionally be important for plaintiffs to feel adequately
represented, it may also lead to stereotyping, social rifts, difficult intragroup relations, and
increased conflict. See King et al., supra, at 278 (describing the risk of conflict in diverse
groups); Mannix & Neale, supra, at 33–35 (describing the negative consequences of
diversity in groups); Stephanie Francis Ward, Women Should Be Among Lead Lawyers in
IUD Case, Federal Judge Says, A.B.A. J. (May 20, 2013, 7:00 PM), http://www.abajournal.
com/news/article/iud_litigation_needs_some_women_as_lead_lawyers_says_federal_judge
(citing a federal judge’s comment that given the nature of the intrauterine-device litigation,
the lack of female lawyers on plaintiffs’ proposed executive committee could be
problematic).
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iences—traits that are imprecise and hard to evaluate.252 Cognitive
differences and personality traits are not the same thing, and thus cog-
nitive abilities cannot reliably be measured with personality indicators
like Myers-Briggs or OCEAN tests.253 Even if judges could assemble
a cognitively diverse group by focusing on ability, training, and exper-
iences,254 there would still be a danger that members’ cognitive differ-
ences might converge; members may assimilate and become
cohesive.255
Accordingly, leveraging outsiders’ expertise is a more viable
means of achieving cognitive diversity. This is the familiar idea behind
hiring outside consultants. The organization hopes that an outsider
will raise issues that insiders either cannot see or are afraid to voice.256
Outsiders aren’t smarter—they’re just novel and different. They add
value by offering a fresh perspective, challenging the status quo, and
injecting new information into the discussion.257
Outsiders are readily available in multidistrict litigation. Judges
and lead lawyers need look no further than the host of attorneys who
were not appointed to lead positions. Inviting objections and soliciting
feedback from outside attorneys on critical motions and strategy help
to avoid cognitive diversity’s main pitfall—that it is too tough to rec-
ognize from the information that applicants provide. When outsiders
object and share new information, their actions may dovetail with ade-
quate representation’s aims: Having someone represent your interests
means having someone who will dissent on your behalf when your
interests are jeopardized, vocalize your position to the group, and, if
that fails, to the judge.
252 See SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES
BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES 302–09 (2007) (describing how training
and experience cause cognitive diversity).
253 See id. at 377 n.3 (explaining that Myers-Briggs and OCEAN tests capture
personality traits).
254 See id. at 362 (describing a heuristic in the college-admissions context to create a
cognitively diverse group).
255 See id. at 343 (“[O]utsiders do not stay outsiders for long.”).
256 See id. at 343–44 (describing the valuable perspective of outsider consultants in
business); Schulz-Hardt et al., supra note 132, at 564 (“Initial preference heterogeneity was
a necessary condition for disagreement . . . when the group started its information search.
This consistent disagreement led to lower commitment to the preliminary group decision
and lower confidence about having already found the best alternative . . . , and these two
processes, in turn, debiased group information seeking.”).
257 See PAGE, supra note 252, at 344 (“Visiting committees and consultants challenge
the status quo. . . . [They] identify new policy dimensions, and they force us to abandon our
existing predictive models.”); Ulrich Klocke, How to Improve Decision Making in Small
Groups: Effects of Dissent and Training Interventions, 38 SMALL GROUP RES. 437, 437–38,
460–62 (2007) (describing the benefits of dissenting group members).
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2. Plaintiffs’ Heterogeneous Interests
Even though dissenting outsiders can act as a safety net for ade-
quate representation, they cannot substitute for representative leader-
ship.258 Appointing lead attorneys precludes plaintiffs’ individually
chosen counsel from having a seat at the decision-making table and
thus raises due-process concerns if those attorneys do not adequately
represent them. Adequate representation demands separate counsel
when structural conflicts exist or where certain claimants’ unique
issues might not be fully developed.259 Structural conflicts arise when
there is a danger that counsel “might skew [the litigation] systemati-
cally” to favor some claimants over others “on grounds aside from
reasoned evaluation of their respective claims or . . . disfavor claim-
ants generally vis-a`-vis the lawyers themselves.”260
Structural conflicts present a high bar for truly separate represen-
tation. Plaintiffs’ goals, injuries, claims, and remedies are likely to run
the gamut, but often do not meet this threshold.261 So, while separate
counsel may not always be required, it is worthwhile for judges to
solicit information from attorneys that reveals how familiar they are
with those variations.
Selecting qualified representatives based on their clients’ dif-
ferent interests is also more likely to create a cognitively diverse com-
mittee.262 If lead lawyers’ clients’ aims and preferences vary, the
committee will likely include dissenters who challenge the status quo
and inject new information into the discussion.263 Soliciting that infor-
mation through leadership applications incentivizes attorneys to iden-
258 Separate representation matters less in certain leadership positions, like liaison
counsel. Liaison counsel disseminates information and acts more as a conduit than a
decision maker. But adequate representation is critically important in conducting
discovery, choosing bellwether cases, and negotiating settlement.
259 See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.05 cmt. k (2010)
(calling for separating counsel to address conflicts on central issues).
260 Id. § 2.07(a)(1)(B); see also Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class
Settlements Under Attack, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1677–1700 (2008) (defining “structural
defects” in classes).
261 For detailed information on differences among claimants and how they may fall into
more cohesive subgroups, see Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Together: Social,
Moral, and Legal Obligations, 91 B.U. L. REV. 87, 121–25 (2011).
262 See Schulz-Hardt et al., supra note 132, at 566 (noting that task-oriented conflict can
counteract biased information seeking and that “one way to facilitate this task-oriented
conflict is to select members with heterogeneous decision preferences when forming
groups”).
263 See id. at 582–83 (explaining that genuine dissent counteracts group polarization and
proposing that appointing heterogeneous group members with different functional and
educational backgrounds will produce dissent).
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tify potential conflicts early on and, by making them explicit, take
appropriate steps to ensure informed consent.264
3. Litigation Financing Abilities
Diversifying lead lawyers may be difficult if judges continue to
heavily factor attorneys’ ability to finance the litigation into their deci-
sions and refuse to permit alternative financing arrangements. Estab-
lished law firms tend to have more assets available to fund common-
benefit work, which means that judges will continue to choose repeat
players.265 Yet, financing need not impede otherwise-qualified attor-
neys if judges permit third-party funding arrangements. When prop-
erly disclosed to the court (as all alternative financing should be) and
allowed by the relevant state bar, certain third-party financing can
solve funding and monitoring problems.266 Still, not all alternative
financing arrangements are created equal: As I have explored in depth
elsewhere,267 financing options can differ substantially, and each type
has its own benefits and drawbacks.268
First, financiers might loan money directly to plaintiffs’ law firms
when those firms cannot secure loans from traditional sources like
banks. These recourse loans are secured by all of the firm’s assets,
including future fee awards. On the upside, loans to law firms may
make newer market entrants and less liquid firms eligible for leader-
ship positions. But, because these financiers charge significantly
higher interest rates than banks, they may amplify the pressure to
settle quickly and avoid added interest charges.269
The second novel but more promising form of financing would be
to permit the funder to contract directly with an attorney’s clients for
264 If judges sense a fear among attorneys that such candor could prejudice their claims
vis-a`-vis defendants, then they could review applications in camera.
265 See Samuel Issacharoff, Litigation Funding and the Problem of Agency Cost in
Representative Actions, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 561, 577 (2014) (noting “concerns that the
‘usual characters’ tend to dominate certain classes of aggregate litigation and that the
established resources of some major players help create an entrenched bar”).
266 Burch, supra note 16, at 1273, 1331–32 (discussing the need to disclose funding
agreements to prevent collusion between attorneys and financiers who might aspire to
influence or control litigation decisions).
267 See id. at 1300–11 (discussing different forms of alternative financing).
268 Cf. Charles Silver, Litigation Funding Versus Liability Insurance: What’s the
Difference?, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 617, 621 (2014) (“Although [insurers and third-party
funders] presumably use contracts to maximize the joint welfare of themselves and the
parties they work with, the manner in which the contracts operate reflects the opposition
of the parties in litigation. . . . Funding contracts are intended to maximize net expected
gains from lawsuits.”).
269 See Burch, supra note 16, at 1312–13, 1318–19 (discussing interest rates charged and
noting the greater incentive to settle).
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a percentage of the clients’ proceeds.270 This is akin to a plaintiff
paying the financier a contingent fee—if she loses, she owes nothing,
but if she wins, the contingency goes to the financier. In return, the
financier pays the client’s attorney on a billable-hour rate plus a small
percentage of the funder’s gross proceeds as a successful litigation
bonus.271 Like loaning money directly to law firms, this allows attor-
neys in firms with less capital to serve in leadership roles, but it also
incentivizes sophisticated financiers to vet attorneys, monitor them,
and keep costs reasonable. The financier’s and attorney’s self-interests
tend to check one another in advantageous ways: Working on a
billable-hour rate incentivizes attorneys to spend time communicating
with their clients and consulting with “outside” non-lead attorneys,
which counterbalances a financier’s push for quick settlement.272 But
the bonus rewards efficiency and productivity, which reduces attor-
neys’ incentives to unduly prolong the litigation or duplicate effort.273
The main drawback to this approach, however, is that it covers only
costs for counsel’s contractual clients, not the added amount needed
to fund work for all plaintiffs’ benefit.
A third option could thus work as a stand-alone financing
arrangement or function alongside the previous proposal to cover
common-benefit costs for plaintiffs with whom the lead lawyers have
no contract. As with loans to plaintiffs’ law firms, financiers could con-
tract directly with firms to cover the cost of performing common-
benefit work. The key to this arrangement’s success, however, hinges
on the contract’s compensation provisions and ensuring that lead
attorneys—not financiers—retain decision-making control.274 If the
funding contract simply loans the firm money at a specified interest
rate, the dangers of a financier hijacking settlement discussions and
lawyers pushing for an early settlement persist. If the funding contract
pays the attorney on a billable-hour rate with the financier receiving
lead lawyers’ contingent-fee award, then the attorneys might unneces-
sarily protract the litigation. But, if the funding contract pays lead law-
yers on a billable-hour rate and includes a sliding-scale litigation
bonus tied to the judge’s performance assessment under quantum-
270 This percentage should not exceed a state’s permissible contingent fee for attorneys.
271 See Burch, supra note 16, at 1319–20 (describing a system of a negotiated billable-
hour rate overseen by a financier).
272 The decision to settle should, of course, remain with the client. See id. at 1320–21
(discussing rules of professional conduct and decision-making control).
273 See id. at 1319–20 (describing the incentives of bonus rewards).
274 See id. at 1320–24 (discussing various possibilities for decision-making control and
arguing that clients should retain ultimate control over their settlement decisions).
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meruit principles, this may appropriately balance both parties’
incentives.275
Granted, claimants do not consent to this form of financing as
they would if they contracted directly with the funder, but then they
do not consent to judges appointing lead lawyers either. Yet, compen-
sating lead lawyers necessarily rests on restitution, not contract princi-
ples. So, extending those restitutionary mores to financiers through
quantum-meruit principles is not as far-fetched as it might initially
seem. As Part III.B elaborates below, quantum-meruit considerations
include assessing lead lawyers’ work, the status of the case, and the
litigation’s outcome. Lead attorneys thus have an incentive to work
hard to improve the settlement on plaintiffs’ behalf and not to unduly
protract the litigation. And, as sophisticated investors, financiers
would presumably fund only qualified counsel, thereby alleviating
some of the judge’s vetting responsibilities.276
4. Procedural Aspects of Lead-Lawyer Appointments
Information about financing, diverse interests, and attorneys’
qualifications may not be readily available when cases are first trans-
ferred. As such, this section suggests modifying appointment proce-
dures in four ways to reduce informational asymmetries and improve
representation. First, as to timing, judges should consider appointing
interim leadership until they can identify conflicting interests. The
interim selection process could be an abbreviated version of the
detailed procedures that follow, which include publishing a proposed
leadership slate followed by a “notice and comment” period with con-
fidential objections and supporting documentation.277 Once
appointed, interim counsel would serve until enough information
exists to assess plaintiffs’ heterogeneous interests and potential struc-
tural conflicts.278
That informational tipping point might arise upon receiving a
motion for class certification, or earlier, depending on how quickly the
issues develop and how soon attorneys file suit. Class certification
275 See infra Part III.B (discussing the advantages of compensating lead lawyers on a
quantum-meruit basis).
276 See Issacharoff, supra note 265, at 574 (describing how, in some respects, funders are
in a better position than lawyers to assess cases).
277 See, e.g., In re Bos. Scientific Corp., Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No.
2326, slip op. at 9 (S.D.W. Va. Feb. 29, 2012) (Pretrial Order No. 1), available at
http://www.wvsd.uscourts.gov/MDL/amsinc/pdfs/PTO_1.pdf (“Written objections may be
made to the appointment of a proposed applicant or nominee. . . . Any objections should
be concise yet thorough and have any necessary documentation attached.”).
278 For more information on structural conflicts, see supra note 260 and accompanying
text.
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motions can prove helpful in singling out conflicts given that they lev-
erage defendants’ incentives to pinpoint dissimilarities among the
plaintiffs. But reaching that tipping point also requires a critical mass
of plaintiffs’ attorneys to have appeared. A recent study by the
Federal Judicial Center demonstrates that highly specialized repeat
players appear earlier in multidistrict litigation than do other attor-
neys, making their first appearance an average of 73 days after
transfer.279 Repeat players with fewer appearances arrive after 333
days, and on average, attorneys appear 419 days post-transfer.280 This
suggests that judges will have more attorneys from which to choose if
they wait longer than three months to appoint permanent leadership.
Second, conducting an evidentiary hearing can introduce
nonrepeat players to the court, increase transparency, and help pre-
vent informational cascades.281 Cascades based on misinformation are
less likely to occur with an open vetting process, where competing
attorneys object, inject new information into the discussion, and pro-
vide reasons for appointing one person over another.282 As such, this
process provides judges with an opportunity to distinguish between
meritorious challenges and strategic ones designed to extort
backroom payoffs.283 Moreover, an evidentiary hearing provides
counsel an opportunity to ask the judge questions about the process
and state her case for selection.284
Third, judges can improve the information they receive about
applicants by tailoring application forms for specific positions, using
the evidentiary hearings to glean additional information, soliciting
feedback from law clerks, and then assimilating and scoring applicants
279 Margaret S. Williams, Emery G. Lee III & Catherine R. Borden, Repeat Players in
Federal Multidistrict Litigation, 5 J. TORT L. 141, 166 (2014) (“On average, attorneys
appear 419 days after centralization—more than a year. Among our repeat-player group
(ten or more MDL proceedings in the study period), attorneys appeared on average 333
days after centralization—just under a year. . . . But super-repeat attorneys, with 30 or
more MDL proceedings, appeared on average after just 73 days.”).
280 Id.
281 See Samuel Issacharoff & R. David Proctor, Selection and Compensation of Counsel
in Multi-District Litigation, Presentation to the 2012 Transferee Judges Conference 17, 23
(Oct. 23, 2012), available at http://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/judicialstudies/
mdl2014/Selection_Compensation_Counsel.pdf (suggesting evidentiary hearings on
attorneys’ qualifications and common application forms to facilitate comparisons between
attorneys).
282 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 62, at 64, 70–72 (describing the benefits that organizations
receive when they allow dissenting opinions to be expressed).
283 This practice is well known in the class-action context. E.g., Edward Brunet, Class
Action Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or Fairness Guarantors, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
403, 432–33. Given anecdotal evidence and the overlap of repeat players in both contexts,
there is reason to think it persists in multidistrict litigation.
284 Issacharoff & Proctor, supra note 281, at 23.
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based on their relevant qualifications.285 As Nobel Prize–winning
economist Daniel Kahneman suggests, formulas and scores (as
opposed to expert intuition) tend to better predict a candidate’s suc-
cess by combating the halo effect, where positive initial impressions
influence later judgments.286 To create an application form,
Kahneman suggests selecting a few relevant traits that are prerequi-
sites for success in the position, making a list of questions for each
trait, and ultimately scoring those traits on a one-to-five scale.287 For
example, based on the typical responsibilities of plaintiffs’ steering
committee, judges might seek members who are organized, respon-
sible, and responsive; excel in written and oral communication;
demonstrate leadership skills; have experience conducting depositions
and large-scale document review; have expertise in the litigation’s
subject matter; and represent clients with various injuries and claims
(or only a subset of interests). After creating a list of relevant traits,
judges should then recruit other evaluators with less insider knowl-
edge—such as term law clerks—to review the forms and score the
applicants.288
Reviewers would rate attorneys’ qualifying traits based on the
applications and information gleaned during the evidentiary hearing.
Kahneman recommends collecting the information “one trait at a
time, scoring each before . . . mov[ing] on to the next one,” then,
without discussing scores with each other, tabulating them to create a
presumptive leadership roster.289 At that point, the judge should con-
sider whether the presumptive slate adequately represents plaintiffs’
various interests.290 She could then substitute qualified attorneys who
represent clients with conflicting interests and who would promote
discourse and dissent.291
285 Id.
286 KAHNEMAN, supra note 110, at 82–83, 222–33.
287 Id. at 232.
288 This further combats the halo effect and the impulse to empower only known
attorneys, while sidelining personal biases. See id. at 231–32 (defining the halo effect and
suggesting how it might be avoided).
289 Id. at 232. Note that while this is somewhat of an “objective” measure, it differs
substantially from Professors Silver and Miller’s proposal of assigning presumptive
leadership to those with the largest client inventory. Silver & Miller, supra note 13, at
159–69. As noted, that approach can reward attorneys who collect an undifferentiated
mass of cases with varying claims and complicate settlement.
290 It may be less important to have diverse representation for purely administrative
positions, like liaison counsel.
291 See Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21 (1979)
(referring to the touchstone for a good judicial decision or approved settlement as whether
the court “tolerates, or even invites, a multiplicity of spokesmen,” with “each perhaps
representing different views as to what is in the interest of the victim group”); cf. PAGE,
supra note 252, at 362 (proposing a hypothetical college-admissions process in which
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Finally, some judges have suggested imposing one-year “term”
limits on leadership appointments such that they can continually reas-
sess the lawyers’ effectiveness.292 While this does provide added
incentive for lead lawyers to continue working hard, it has the down-
side of making them principally beholden to the judge. Lead lawyers
vigorously representing their clients could be in danger of replace-
ment if they displease the judge, which may encourage them to curry
judicial favor at the expense of fulfilling their fiduciary obligations to
plaintiffs. The better alternative might be to allow non-lead attorneys
to request substitutions or additions to the roster if lead lawyers
neglect cases or if new information on conflicts comes to light.293
B. Lead Lawyers’ Fees: A Quantum-Meruit Theory of Fee Awards
Selecting lead lawyers is, of course, only half the battle. Once
chosen, lead lawyers raise compensation questions.294 As Part II.B
explained, judges have traditionally relied on an amalgam of doctrines
to accomplish this task, which has resulted in less predictability and
created an opportunity for repeat players to contractually increase
their fees. The mismatch is apparent: A judicially appointed lead
lawyer who does not operate under the goodwill afforded by contrac-
tual consent should likewise have the judge set her fees through a
transparent process, not through backdoor trades with the defendant
that are slipped into a settlement.
What is needed then is a standard by which judges assess the
value that lead lawyers add. Such a standard exists in quantum
meruit.295 Quantum meruit lies at the heart of each of the theories
that judges have invoked in the past to piece together compensation
decisions—contract, restitution, and equity—and compensates lead
admittees are chosen by a mathematical formula and then a group of outsiders looks for
ways to increase relevant diversity while maintaining average ability level).
292 Issacharoff & Proctor, supra note 281, at 25.
293 Some judges have, for example, helped ensure adequate representation by
appointing a new plaintiffs’ steering committee for nonsettling plaintiffs after the original
committee negotiated a proposed deal with the defendant. E.g., In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab.
Litig., 467 F. Supp. 2d 256, 261–62 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). Judge Fallon appointed additional
counsel to the plaintiffs’ steering committee to represent ineligible or unenrolled claimants
post-settlement. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657 (E.D. La. Jan. 8, 2010)
(Pretrial Order No. 45A), available at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/vioxx/Orders/PTO45A
.pdf.
294 This is, however, controversial. Professors Silver and Miller’s proposal, for example,
proposes selection methods but does not suggest that judges should compensate the
steering committee. Silver & Miller, supra note 13, at 159–76.
295 Quantum meruit is generally used only where parties do not agree to compensation
in advance and can thus be thought of as a theory of recovery as opposed to a substantive
legal theory, such as contracts.
\\jciprod01\productn\n\nyu\90-1\nyu102.txt unknown Seq: 59 30-MAR-15 8:32
April 2015] JUDGING MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 129
lawyers for contributions that benefit the plaintiffs.296 Given that lead
lawyers benefit different plaintiffs to different degrees, this allows
judges to tailor awards to match the circumstances. As such, it could
likewise reduce compensation for free-riding attorneys who do little
more than file cases, wait for lead lawyers to negotiate a proposed
settlement, and collect their fee.
Courts have long used quantum-meruit awards to compensate
attorneys where they are discharged without cause and work on con-
tingent fees,297 they dispute how to divide fees among themselves,298
they voluntarily withdraw with good cause,299 no fee agreement
exists,300 local counsel is fired before a contingency occurs,301 and
even when attorneys serve as special counsel to a debtor in bank-
ruptcy.302 Likewise, the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers gives counsel a right to recover a fair fee in quantum meruit
when “a client and lawyer have not made a valid contract providing
for another measure of compensation.”303 In multidistrict litigation,
even though the client contracts with her chosen attorney, she typi-
cally has no contract with the lead lawyers. Rather, the situation is
more akin to a forced referral or sale, where the individual’s attorney
296 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1361–62 (9th ed. 2009); Lauren Krohn, Cause of Action
by Attorney to Recover Fees on Quantum Meruit Basis, in 16 CAUSES OF ACTION 85, 91
(Shepard’s Editorial Staff eds., 1988).
297 E.g., Dean v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 860 F.2d 670, 672 (6th Cir. 1988); Crockett & Myers,
Ltd. v. Napier, Fitzgerald & Kirby, LLP, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1123–24 (D. Nev. 2005);
Marks v. Struble, 347 F. Supp. 2d 136, 144 (D.N.J. 2004); Byrne v. Leblond, 811 N.Y.S.2d
681, 682–83 (App. Div. 2006); Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Lawyers’ Contracts Is
Different, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 443, 457–58 (1998).
298 E.g., Kirschner & Venker, P.C. v. Taylor & Martino, P.C., 627 S.E.2d 112, 113 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2006) (holding that local counsel was entitled to recover the quantum-meruit
value for its services even though the firm was fired before the contingency became
payable); Carr v. Pearman, 860 N.E. 2d 863, 868–70, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that
counsel was entitled to quantum-meruit recovery even after violating professional conduct
rules by failing to obtain a written contingency-fee agreement); Byrne, 811 N.Y.S.2d at
682–83 (holding that a further hearing was necessary to determine the compensation that
discharged counsel should have received on a quantum-meruit basis). But cf. Truly v.
Austin, 744 S.W.2d 934, 938 (Tex. 1988) (refusing to award quantum-meruit recovery to an
attorney with unclean hands).
299 E.g., Stall v. First Nat’l Bank of Buhl, 375 N.W.2d 841, 845–46 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985).
300 E.g., Crockett & Myers, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 1124 (D. Nev. 2005); Jacks v. Sullinger,
224 So. 2d 583, 583–85 (Ala. 1969) (compensating a deceased attorney’s estate in quantum
meruit when no agreement was in place for the attorney’s services prior to his death).
301 E.g., Kirschner & Venker, 627 S.E.2d at 113.
302 E.g., In re EBW Laser, Inc., 333 B.R. 351, 357 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2005); In re Allen,
217 B.R. 952, 955 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998). See generally Krohn, supra note 296, at 92 (“A
quantum meruit analysis of attorneys’ fees will therefore be appropriate in virtually any
case in which the value of legal services is at issue.”).
303 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 39 (2000).
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hands clients over to the lead lawyers who bundle and pursue some
aspects together.304 Thus, grounding lead lawyers’ fee awards in
quantum meruit brings them in line with actual practice and with
attorneys’ fees jurisprudence more generally.
Granted, given its lineage in contract, equity, common-benefit
funds, and attorneys’ fees, the law surrounding quantum-meruit
awards is jumbled, to say the least. Although lead lawyers plainly have
the burden of establishing their fees’ reasonableness and hence the
value they conferred,305 assessing that value can vary depending on
the cases cited. Relying on cases where attorneys failed to contract in
advance with clients, for instance, would be inappropriate since those
circumstances result in conservative fees and do not capture the
uniqueness of multidistrict litigation committees.306 Similarly, stan-
dards used to assess fees under fee-shifting statutes are designed with
different public-policy goals in mind and run the risk of being too gen-
erous. Instead, leadership committees are most analogous to a situa-
tion in which the client employs her chosen attorney and that
attorney, in turn, relies on (in effect, employs) lead lawyers.
Because “quantum meruit” by definition implies a recovery goal
based on “how much is merited” as opposed to a specific cause of
action, assessing fair value307 should depend on the lead lawyers’
billing practices (whether hourly billing or contingent fees), work, and
time spent;308 the status of the case; and the amount of work the indi-
vidual plaintiffs’ chosen attorneys contributed to the outcome.309
304 See Curtis & Resnik, supra note 69, at 447 (recognizing the “forced referral or sale”
of individual cases to PSC members and suggesting that paying PSC members for their
work reflects the concept of “quantum meruit”).
305 Anderson v. Anchor Org. for Health Maint., 654 N.E.2d 675, 681 (Ill. Ct. App. 1995);
Krohn, supra note 296, at 94.
306 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 39 cmt. c (“A
conservative evaluation is usually appropriate in assessing fees under this Section. When a
lawyer fails to agree with the client in advance on the fee to be charged, the client should
not have to pay as much as some clients might have agreed to pay.”).
307 Id. § 39 cmt. b(ii).
308 See Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1974)
(assessing the time spent on a case), abrogated on other grounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron,
489 U.S. 87, 93 (1989); Ackermann v. Levine, 610 F. Supp. 633, 635–40 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(examining specific services rendered), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 788 F.2d 830, 844–45 (2d
Cir. 1986); Hiscott & Robinson v. King, 626 A.2d 1235, 1238 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)
(considering an attorney’s hourly billing rate); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 39 cmt. c (discussing hourly fees); Perillo, supra note 297, at 448
(discussing competing views on compensation of attorneys who violate their duties to a
client after some services are performed).
309 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 39 cmt. c (“The
standard rate or hourly fee might be modified by other factors bearing on fairness,
including success in the representation and whether the lawyer assumed part of the risk of
the client’s loss, as in a contingent-fee contract.”); Lester Brickman, Setting the Fee when
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Judges should also consider the case’s success, lead lawyers’ opportu-
nity costs, and whether the attorneys assumed financial risk to pursue
the litigation.310 In this vein, quantum-meruit awards entail a compar-
ative, fact-specific, contextualized evaluation of lead attorneys’ work
and risk over time as opposed to a flat percentage-of-the-fund tax at
the beginning of litigation, which could over- or undercompensate in
certain circumstances.311
While lead lawyers might theoretically insert provisions within a
master settlement agreement that alert enrolling state-court plaintiffs
(and their counsel) that their award will be subject to the federal
judge’s quantum-meruit fee assessment, those assessments should ulti-
mately reflect the value lead lawyers added to the cases. Although
lead attorneys may confer substantial value on state cases by negoti-
ating a settlement, unless state-court attorneys relied on joint dis-
covery efforts, lead lawyers may have benefitted them less than those
within the multidistrict litigation. Thus, the fee should reflect a pro-
portional reduction. As this suggests, adhering to a quantum-meruit
theory demands certain limits, which could improve predictability and
consistency in awarding fees.
First, because the general theory supporting quantum-meruit
recovery is that the circumstances have changed and judges are imple-
menting the fee that is merited based on lead lawyers’ work, the total
contingency charged to clients should not fluctuate. Put simply, if a
client agreed to a 30% contingent fee, that percentage should remain
static. She is paying attorneys to complete the work on her case. Her
chosen attorney has, in effect (though not necessarily willingly), hired
a second set of attorneys to do a portion of that work. So, the court
the Client Discharges a Contingent Fee Attorney, 41 EMORY L.J. 367, 392–93 (1992)
(discussing the importance of the size of the recovery in determining appropriate
compensation).
310 E.g., Richardson v. Parish of Jefferson, 727 So. 2d 705, 708 (La. Ct. App. 1999);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 39 cmt. c. Although
Congress has not provided guidance for awarding attorneys’ fees in multidistrict litigation,
bankruptcy provides an important comparison. In bankruptcy, judges can award trustees
“reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services” and “reimbursement for actual,
necessary expenses.” 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2012). Reasonable compensation is
calculated based on a number of factors, including “time spent,” “rates charged,” “whether
the services were necessary . . . or beneficial,” whether the services were timely given the
case’s complexity, and what other comparably skilled practitioners would charge. Id.
§ 330(a)(3). But the statute specifically prohibits judges from compensating attorneys for
duplicate or unnecessary services, as well as services that were not “reasonably likely to
benefit the debtor’s estate.” Id. § 330(a)(4).
311 See Curtis & Resnik, supra note 69, at 442 (“[Fees] should be based on fact-specific,
contextualized evaluations that include assessments of risk, as it changes over time and
payments for investments of both capital and of work, including the provision of services of
individual litigants.”).
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may award lead lawyers whatever portion of that fee reflects their
value.
Second, courts often exclude pro se litigants from having to pay
lead lawyers’ fees and costs even though they, like claimants with
counsel, may benefit from lead attorneys’ efforts.312 It is true that pro
se litigants have not retained any lawyer and thus have not consented
whatsoever to legal representation. But allowing them to “opt out” is
inconsistent with a quantum-meruit theory, which hinges on someone
receiving a benefit for which they have not paid. That is true even if
the court subscribes to the common fund’s interpretation of quantum
meruit: The purpose of a common fund is to “require . . . others—in
the absence of contract—to contribute ratably to the cost of securing
the common benefit.”313 Under that rule, all claimants are linked by
their joint interest in “a common legal position.”314 Because their
interests are interconnected and lead lawyers have benefitted them by
advancing the ball in some material way, judges should not excuse pro
se litigants from paying lead-lawyer fees.
Third, if lead attorneys have their own clients, as they should,315
quantum meruit suggests the court should compensate them only for
the benefit they confer on others beyond the work they would typi-
cally perform for their own cases.316 Just think: If several lawyers won
big verdicts on their own in separate courts, the positive externalities
from those trials would spill over to other cases around the country.
Yet, the beneficiaries would not pay for the externality. As the restitu-
tionary basis for class-action awards makes plain, “class counsel may
base a claim for fees only on the enhanced recovery obtained for a
class: the difference, in other words, between what the class received
in consequence of the lawyer’s intervention and what the class would
have received without it.”317 Of course, measuring this gain in mul-
tidistrict litigation is much harder since a judge cannot simply identify
312 See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster at Fla. Everglades on December 29, 1972, 549 F.2d
1006, 1010 n.5 (5th Cir. 1977) (“Claimants who had not retained counsel were excluded
from payment of the fee.”).
313 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 29 cmt. a (2011).
314 Id.
315 Supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text.
316 Cf. In re Air Crash, 549 F.2d at 1017 (responding to the criticism that attorneys
should not be paid for doing something they would have to do on behalf of their own
clients by pointing out that “[i]t is uncertain that appellants or any other plaintiff lawyers
would have been able to conduct prompt, orderly, precise and fruitful discovery if there
had been a multitude of diligent lawyers pushing for the front seat and the maximum
advantage”).
317 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 29 cmt. c.
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the reasonable value of an attorney’s service.318 Consequently, judges
have prohibited lead attorneys from reporting “time spent on devel-
oping or processing individual issues in any case for an individual
client” and allowed only “time spent on matters common to all claim-
ants” when requesting a fee.319
Fourth, quantum meruit suggests that automatically awarding a
flat percentage320 of plaintiffs’ awards without considering the circum-
stances or the work completed may be inappropriate since the fee
should be “an amount considered reasonable to compensate a person
who has rendered services in a quasi-contractual relationship.”321 For
instance, if cases were transferred back to their original fora for trial
as Congress intended, reflexively awarding lead lawyers a flat per-
centage of plaintiffs’ settlement could be unreasonable given that indi-
vidual counsel ushered in the final result.322 To be sure, this does not
suggest using the lodestar method in lieu of a percentage method;
rather, it means that judges should tailor the percentage to the
circumstances.
Tailored fee awards could thus vary depending on whether a case
is remanded, whether it goes to trial, whether and when it is settled,
the role lead lawyers played in achieving that settlement, and the
overall cost savings achieved through economies of scale and mass set-
tlement.323 As the Eighth Circuit recognized in assessing fees against
class-action opt-outs who landed in multidistrict litigation, awarding
an automatic, across-the-board percentage risks giving lead lawyers a
windfall, particularly if one case goes to trial and includes a significant
punitive-damage award: “[A]ssuming one plaintiff receives $1,000,500
in damages, lead counsel would be entitled to $300,000 and liaison
counsel would be entitled to $100,000. . . . A fee award that gives
court-appointed counsel a windfall and unfairly penalizes either plain-
318 See Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, Quantum Meruit and the Restatement (Third)
of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 27 REV. LITIG. 127, 130 (2007) (noting the potential
difficulty of measuring gain instead of merely the reasonable value of services rendered).
319 In re Guidant Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708 (DWF/AJB), slip
op. at 9 (D. Minn. Feb. 15, 2006) (Pretrial Order No. 6) (emphasis omitted).
320 See, e.g., In re Air Crash, 549 F.2d at 1010–11 (observing that the district court
awarded lead lawyers an 8% contingent fee).
321 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1361–62 (9th ed. 2009).
322 Cf. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 72, § 21.71 (“Compensating
counsel for the actual benefits conferred on the class members is the basis for awarding
attorney fees.”); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.13 cmt. b (2010)
(“[T]he percentage method may not be feasible when the value of the common fund is
difficult to assess. . . . In those circumstances, the court should use the lodestar method.”).
323 In this way, the fee award is concerned with not only whether the work was
performed by lead lawyers or individual counsel, but whether aggregation diminished the
total amount of work per client.
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tiffs or defendants does not constitute ‘fair reimbursement and com-
pensation.’”324 Likewise, small judgments or settlements run the risk
of undercompensation.325
This principle of tailoring fee awards to the work completed and
result obtained risks becoming a double-edged sword by further pres-
suring lead lawyers to settle. Yet, substantial pressure to settle already
exists326 and, as the next section explores, using a quantum-meruit
theory to award fees would give the transferee judge a private-law
basis to assess the settlement’s terms. Thus, this inquiry should help
alleviate concerns about collusive deals, deals that favor some claim-
ants over others on unreasonable grounds, and deals that disfavor
claimants generally vis-a`-vis the lead lawyers.327
Finally, nothing in quantum-meruit theory allows judges to indis-
criminately cap contingent-fee agreements. If judges’ concern is that
individual counsel will receive a windfall since they no longer perform
the lion’s share of the work, then that concern should be addressed by
increasing lead lawyers’ share, not cutting contingent fees. Of course,
this does not mean that judges cannot address an exorbitant fee in
individual circumstances,328 but doing so would require assessing
whether that fee is unreasonable under the relevant state law and
whether state law permits judicial modification of fee awards.329
In sum, determining how much lead lawyers have benefitted indi-
vidual counsel and their clients in specific cases will depend heavily on
adversarial litigation to yield the relevant information. Even though
appraising fair value should vary depending on a number of inputs330
and entail a fact-specific, contextualized evaluation of lead attorneys’
work and risk over time, judges could place cases in general categories
based on factors like whether the case is in state or federal court and
324 Walitalo v. Iacocca, 968 F.2d 741, 748 (8th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). Courts have
likewise voiced this concern in awarding fees from a common fund in class actions. E.g., In
re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 222 (2d Cir. 1987).
325 Walitalo, 968 F.2d at 748.
326 See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text (discussing judges’ incentives to
encourage settlement); supra notes 106–08 and accompanying text (discussing attorneys’
reputations, which would extend to reputations as deal makers).
327 See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.07(a) (describing the
rights of individual claimants in aggregate litigation).
328 See Int’l Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. W. Airlines, Inc., 623 F.2d 1255, 1277 (8th Cir.
1980) (noting the court’s power to monitor contingency fees for reasonableness).
329 See supra notes 218–21 and accompanying text (discussing how judges apply state
ethics codes to evaluate the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees).
330 Inputs include factors such as the lead lawyers’ billing rates, work, and time spent;
the type of work the lead lawyers performed (i.e., the committees on which they served);
the status of the case and its success; the amount of work the plaintiffs’ chosen attorneys
contributed to the outcome; lead lawyers’ opportunity costs; and whether the attorneys
assumed financial risks when pursuing the litigation.
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whether individual counsel relied on lead lawyers’ discovery efforts.
They could further dissect lead lawyers’ value based on committee
assignment. Certain committees like the plaintiffs’ steering committee
or executive management committee may play a larger role (and thus
confer a larger benefit) in achieving a satisfactory outcome. Con-
ducting hearings would provide objectors an opportunity to make
their case and would equip judges with enough information to tailor
the lead lawyers’ fees to each case (or each category). Hearings and
orders have the added benefit of making the fee award appealable—
an essential error-correcting tool that lead lawyers sometimes dodge
by writing fees into private settlements.
C. Evaluating Settlements Through Quantum-Meruit
Fee Assessments
In class actions, there is no shortage of concern over self-dealing,
collusion, and principal-agent problems, but as the introductory exam-
ples of Vioxx, Guidant, and the Genetically Modified Rice Litigation
illustrated in Part I, those concerns do not dissipate when judges deny
class certification. Although clients are not absent in multidistrict liti-
gation as they are in class actions, they are not able to monitor their
attorneys as they might in truly individual litigation. When attorneys
represent hundreds of plaintiffs in the same suit, communicating
meaningfully and informing each client fully becomes more difficult
logistically unless attorneys embrace technology to widely disseminate
information.331 Information about one’s own case says little about
how the litigation is progressing overall, so even clients who receive
regular updates may not have a complete picture.
In many ways, multidistrict litigation complicates the incentives,
dynamics, and temptations that Rule 23 simplified through heightened
judicial control and scrutiny. Rather than addressing a single dynamic
between largely absent class members and class counsel, multidistrict
litigation incorporates a pyramid relationship where lead lawyers act
as agents for individual attorneys who act as agents for their clients.
Not only must agents watch other agents over whom they lack any
331 See, e.g., Robert H. Klonoff et al., Making Class Actions Work: The Untapped
Potential of the Internet, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 727 (2008) (discussing the capacity of the
internet to positively impact class-action participation); see also Weinstein, supra note 70,
at 457–60 (2012) (describing lawyers’ and judges’ use of technology to keep individual
plaintiffs apprised of the status of mass litigation). This is not to say that attorneys
representing many clients in the same litigation do not comply with MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2014) (requiring lawyers to communicate certain types of
information to their clients), but that the character of the relationship itself changes from a
one-on-one relationship to a less personal group setting.
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control, but the judge also lacks any formal power to police the
settlement.332
These circumstances present a quandary for the scrupulous trans-
feree judge when parties announce a private settlement that the judge
thinks is unfair. Circumstances like those led Judge Hellerstein to pub-
licly denounce the settlement reached in the Ground Zero workers’
litigation against New York City, which made achieving the settle-
ment’s required participation rate a foregone impossibility.333 Plus,
the prevalence of repeat players and the trend toward lead lawyers’
self-dealing by writing their fee terms into settlements suggest the
need for safeguards. Yet, given the misplaced adventure into “quasi-
class actions,” parties also need predictability and parameters on judi-
cial review.334
Awarding lead lawyers’ fees on a quantum-meruit basis provides
judges a valid but limited foothold for reviewing settlements.335 While
limited in scope, linking the settlement’s merits to lead lawyers’ fees
creates a powerful disincentive toward self-dealing or collusion. As
noted, quantum-meruit awards require assessing the results obtained
and the objective benefit to the client, such as whether lead lawyers’
work produced a desirable outcome.336 Thus, while the judge lacks the
332 Some argue that judges have no business approving or getting involved in nonclass
settlements because individual plaintiffs freely consent to the deal. Grabill, supra note 9, at
165, 173. While this is technically true, it overlooks the coercive nature of some
settlements. In the Vioxx litigation, for instance, the settlement offer required attorneys to
recommend the deal to all of their clients and to withdraw from representing those who
refused. Plus, settling plaintiffs had to decide whether to settle without ever knowing how
much compensation they would receive. For a detailed rationale as to why individual
consent does not diminish the need for judicial involvement, see Burch, supra note 188, at
512–16.
333 Supra notes 241–42 and accompanying text.
334 See supra notes 243–46 and accompanying text (casting doubt on quasi-class actions
as a viable rationale). But see Grabill, supra note 9, at 165, 173 (arguing that individual
consent should suffice without judicial involvement).
335 This does not preclude other less formal means of prompting parties to reevaluate
settlement terms. For example, settling parties often ask the court to issue Lone Pine
orders that govern nonsettling plaintiffs, which a judge could refuse to do if she thought the
settlement was coercive. Settlements likewise might include enforcement jurisdiction,
which would allow the court to enforce a settlement if challenged. For more on these two
possibilities, see Grabill, supra note 9, at 179–82.
336 See Salvini v. Flushing Supplies Corp., 137 F.R.D. 190, 195 (D. Mass. 1991) (“Where
a higher level of skill is necessary, or where the efforts of counsel bear a more substantial
relation to the ultimate favorable outcome, [a higher fee in quantum meruit is] . . .
appropriate . . . .”); 520 East 72nd Commercial Corp. v. 520 East 72nd Owners Corp., 691
F. Supp. 728, 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“In determining the value of an attorney’s services in
quantum meruit, the following factors must be considered: 1. The difficulty involved in the
matters in which the services were rendered; 2. The nature of the services; 3. The amount
involved; 4. The professional standing of counsel; 5. The results obtained.” (citation
omitted)), aff’d mem., 872 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1989); In re Hall, 415 B.R. 911, 923 (Bankr.
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authority to “reject” a settlement, if lead lawyers negotiate a deal that
is of little benefit to plaintiffs, then their attorneys’ fees would be
diminished proportionally. Similarly, if the settlement grid grossly
undercompensated claimants with severe injuries and strong proof of
specific causation, then lead lawyers’ fees should likewise suffer.337
Some might claim that even this modest fairness review insults
autonomous agents. But there is substantial cause for concern when
judges informally “approve” settlements as they may when settling
parties request that they issue Lone Pine orders338 to nonsettling
plaintiffs or when they enforce settlements if a party breaches.339 As
Professor Shiffrin explains, a court’s concern in contexts like these
“need not represent an effort to supplant the judgment or action of
the contracting parties,” but “may reasonably be a self-regarding con-
cern not to facilitate or assist harmful, exploitative, or immoral
action.”340 Put differently, just because plaintiffs have the right to
enter these deals doesn’t mean that the government should assist par-
M.D. Ga. 2009) (citing Lewis v. Smith, 618 S.E.2d 32, 35–36 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005)) (“Under
quantum meruit, attorney fees are valued in light of the amount of work done and by the
results obtained. The court must determine whether the client received any benefit from
the services and the value of the services rendered.”); Richardson v. Parish of Jefferson,
727 So. 2d 705, 708 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Johnson v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 666 So. 2d
1286, 1289–90 (La. Ct. App. 1996)) (“A quantum meruit analysis properly evaluates not
merely the hours expended, but the results and benefits obtained.”); Swain v. Kamalsky,
No. 916193C, 1996 WL 33401226, at *5 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 30, 1996) (“Since the efforts
of Simon and Fine bore the most substantial relation to the favorable outcome of the case,
Bader’s efforts should be valued on a quantum meruit basis.”); Krohn, supra note 296, at
95 (“The third category of factors relevant to determining a reasonable attorney’s fee
concerns the result or outcome of the attorney’s representation of the client . . . [including
the] benefit received by the client as a result of the attorney’s services [and] the cost to the
attorney of pursuing the client’s case.”).
337 To be sure, this is not a perfect solution since the number of plaintiffs with less severe
claims will tend to exceed those with serious injuries. Thus, some danger of
overcompensating persists even under a quantum-meruit approach.
338 Lone Pine orders typically require nonsettling plaintiffs to provide some evidentiary
support for their claims. Supra note 58; see also, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 509 F.
App’x 383, 384–85 (5th Cir. 2013) (“[A] Lone Pine order imposed certain discovery
requirements on such plaintiffs, including production of pharmacy and medical records,
expert reports, and answers to Merck’s interrogatories.”). As Jeremy Grabill describes,
“Lone Pine orders . . . govern plaintiffs who choose not to opt in and any copycat plaintiffs
who may file claims after the settlement is announced . . . . [They] provide another leverage
point for a judge who may have concerns about a contemplated settlement.” Grabill, supra
note 9, at 179.
339 After cases settle, plaintiffs typically dismiss their cases under Rule 41. In Kokkonen
v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, the Supreme Court held that “[w]hen the
dismissal is pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) . . . the parties’
compliance with the terms of the settlement contract (or the court’s ‘retention of
jurisdiction’ over the settlement contract) may, in the court’s discretion, be one of the
terms set forth in the order.” 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994).
340 Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and
Accommodation, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 224 (2000).
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ties in carrying them out if the terms are unduly harsh. On the con-
trary, tying lead lawyers’ compensation to the outcome they helped
produce can maintain a delicate balance: preserving the parties’ deci-
sion-making autonomy on one hand and promoting both procedural
fairness and institutional integrity on the other.
CONCLUSION
Multidistrict litigation remains a high-stakes gamble for everyone
involved. But that gamble should hinge on the suit’s substantive
merits, not on whether lead attorneys will fairly represent claimants’
heterogeneous interests, collude with defendants to insert their fees
into settlements, or fall prey to well-documented group decision-
making biases. Nor should that gamble encompass doctrinal unpre-
dictability in awarding lead lawyers’ fees, capping individual attor-
neys’ contingent fees, or commenting on nonclass settlements without
a legal basis. Centering the gamble on substantive merits requires
judges to wield and constrain their authority in ways that promote
procedural legitimacy and doctrinal consistency.
Accordingly, first, judges should delay appointing permanent lead
lawyers until they have sufficient information on conflicts of interest
and, as it becomes available, should consider selecting qualified attor-
neys who use appropriate third-party financing. This will help ensure
that claimants’ diverse interests are adequately represented and that
repeat players are not the only eligible candidates. Second, because
the power to appoint lead lawyers should likewise entail the power to
compensate them, judges need not warp consent through forced fee-
transfer agreements. They should likewise reprimand self-dealing lead
lawyers who try to circumvent quantum-meruit fee assessments
through settlement negotiations with the defendant. Neither plaintiffs
nor their attorneys contractually consent to appointing lead lawyers,
so lead lawyers’ fees should be allocated by the judge through a trans-
parent process, not through the backdoor of settlement. Third,
assessing how lead attorneys benefitted plaintiffs and compensating
them for that added value requires judges to consider the litigation’s
outcome from plaintiffs’ perspective. When the litigation settles,
judges must thus assess the settlement’s attributes. Paying lead law-
yers on a quantum-meruit basis should foster fidelity to the claim-
ants—not to other lawyers or the judge. Finally, encouraging
leadership committees to entertain input from non-lead attorneys on
critical motions and strategy, as well as permitting objections during
judicial hearings on those key motions will leverage dissent to pro-
mote adequate representation and combat group decision-making
biases.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1: ENTRENCHED REPEAT PLAYERS WITH FIVE OR MORE
APPEARANCES AS LEAD LAWYERS
Lead-
Lawyer
Attorney341 Appearances Law Firm
Richard Arsenault 17* Neblett Beard & Arsenault
Daniel Becnel, Jr. 14 Becnel Law Firm LLC
Dianne Nast 14* NastLaw LLC
Christopher Seeger 14 Seeger Weiss LLP
Jerrold Parker 11* Parker Waichman LLP
Jayne Conroy 10* Hanly Conroy Bierstein Sheridan Fisher & Hayes LLP
Michelle Parfitt 10* Ashcraft & Gerel, LLP
Mark Robinson, Jr. 10 Robinson Calcagnie Robinson Shapiro Davis, Inc.
Arnold Levin 9 Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman
Michael London 9 Douglas & London, P.C.
Martin Crump 8* Davis & Crump, P.C.
W. Mark Lanier 8 The Lanier Law Firm
Hunter Shkolnik 8* Napoli Bern Ripka Shkolnik, LLP
Fred Thompson III 8* Motley Rice LLC
Thomas Cartmell 7* Wagstaff & Cartmell
A.J. De Bartolomeo 7* Girard Gibbs LLP
James R. Dugan 7 Dugan Law Firm
Yvonne Flaherty 7* Lockridge Grindal Nauen P.L.L.P.
Pete Flowers 7* Foote Meyers Mielke & Flowers, P.C.
Dave Matthews 7* Matthews & Associates
Richard Meadow 7* The Lanier Law Firm
Joseph A. Osborne 7* Babbitt, Johnson, Osborne & Le Clainche, P.A.
John Restaino 7* Restaino Law Firm, P.C.
Rachel Abrams 6* Levin Simes LLP
Thomas Anapol 6* Anapol Schwartz
Bryan Aylstock 6* Aylstock, Witkin, Kreis & Overhotz, PLLC
Ed Blizzard 6* Blizzard, McCarthy & Nabers
Elizabeth Cabraser 6 Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP
John Climaco 6 Climaco, Wilcox, Peca, Tarantino & Garofoli Co., LPA
Doug Monsour 6* The Monsour Law Firm
Alyson Oliver 6* The Oliver Law Group
Christopher Placitella 6* Cohen, Placitella & Roth, P.C.
Robert Salim 6* Salim-Beasley, LLC
Joseph Zonies 6* Reilly Pozner LLP
Andres Alonso 5 Parker Waichman LLP
341 For a detailed explanation of these numbers, which multidistrict litigation cases were
included in this assessment, and why appointing these repeat players may be problematic,
see supra Part II.A.2, and specifically notes 114–26 and accompanying text.
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Riley Burnett 5* Law Offices of Riley Burnett, Jr.
Eric Chaffin 5* Chaffin Luhana LLP
Clayton Clark 5* Clark, Love & Hutson
Erin Copeland 5* Fibich, Hampton, Leebron, Briggs & Josephson, LLP
Roger Denton 5 Schlichter Bogard & Denton, LLP
Henry Garrard, III 5* Blasingame, Burch, Garrard & Ashley, P.C.
Michael Goetz 5* Morgan & Morgan
Jeff Grand 5* Bernstein Liebhard LLP
Stacy Hauer 5* Johnson Becker PLLC
Scott Love 5* Clark, Love & Hutson
Victoria Maniatis 5* Sanders Viener Grossman, L.L.P.
Michael Miller 5* Michael J. Miller, Esq.
Mark Mueller 5* Mueller Law
Derek Potts 5* Potts Law Firm
Bill Robins, III 5* Heard, Robins, Cloud & Black LLP
Joseph Saunders 5* Saunders & Walker, PA
*Number includes appointment to all four coordinated Pelvic Repair Systems Products Liability
Litigations pending before Judge Goodwin. Coding these four cases as one to account for the overlap
would cause those with seven or fewer appointments to be excluded from this list.
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TABLE 2: ENTRENCHED REPEAT LAW FIRMS WITH FIVE OR MORE
LEAD-LAWYER APPOINTMENTS
Number of
MDL
Positions
by Firm342 Law Firm Name
22* Levin, Middlebrooks, Thomas, Mitchell, Rafferty & Proctor, P.A.
21** Motley Rice LLC
21* Parker Waichman LLP
20* Neblett Beard & Arsenault
20 Seeger Weiss LLP
18* Beasley, Allen, Crow, Methvin, Portis & Miles, P.C.
18* The Lanier Law Firm
17 Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP
16* Robinson Calcagnie Robinson Shapiro Davis, Inc.
15* Aylstock, Witkin, Kreis & Overholtz, PLLC
15 Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman
14* Ashcraft & Gerel, LLP
14 Becnel Law Firm LLC
13* Hanly Conroy Bierstein Sheridan Fisher & Hayes LLP
12* Anapol Schwartz
12* Lockridge Grindal Nauen P.L.L.P.
12* Roda Nast PC
12 Shepherd, Finkelman, Miller & Shah, LLP
11 Douglas & London, P.C.
11* Sanders Viener Grossman, L.L.P.
10** Clark, Love & Hutson
10* Morgan & Morgan
10 Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C.
9** Blasingame, Burch, Garrard & Ashley, P.C.
9 Climaco, Wilcox, Peca, Tarantino & Garofoli Co., LPA
9 Cory Watson Crowder & DeGaris, P.C.
8* Babbitt, Johnson, Osborne & Le Clainche, P.A.
8* Davis & Crump, P.C.
8* Johnson Becker PLLC
8* Matthews & Associates
8* Napoli Bern Ripka Shkolnik, LLP
8 Pope, McGlamry, Kilpatrick, Morrison & Norwood, P.C.
8* Wagstaff & Cartmell
8 Zimmerman Reed
7* Cohen, Placitella & Roth, P.C.
7* Foote Meyers Mielke & Flowers, P.C.
342 This includes firms with five or more affiliated attorneys named as a lead lawyer in a
product-liability multidistrict litigation. Again, for a detailed explanation of these numbers,
see supra Part II.A.2.
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7* Girard Gibbs LLP
7 Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP
7* Levin Simes LLP
7* The Miller Firm, LLC
7* Restaino Law Firm, P.C.
7 Simmons Browder Gianaris Angelides & Barnerd LLC
6* Bernstein Liebhard LLP
6* Blizzard, McCarthy & Nabers
6 Burg Simpson Eldredge Hersh & Jardine, P.C.
6* Fibich, Hampton, Leebron, Briggs & Josephson, LLP
6 Finkelstein Thompson LLP
6 Herman, Herman, Katz & Cotlar, LLP
6* Lewis & Roberts, PLLC
6* The Monsour Law Firm
6* Reilly Pozner LLP
6 Schlichter Bogard & Denton, LLP
5* Andrus Hood & Wagstaff
5 Audet & Partners, LLP
5 Baron & Budd
5* Chaffin Luhana LLP
5* Greene Ketchum Bailey Walker Farrell & Tweel
5* Heard, Robins, Cloud & Black LLP
5 Heninger Garrison Davis, LLC
5* Hersh & Hersh
5 Kiesel Boucher Larson LLP
5* Kline & Specter, P.C.
5* Law Offices of Riley Burnett, Jr.
5* Mueller Law
5* The Oliver Law Group
5* Potts Law Firm
5 Richardson, Patrick, Westbrook & Brickman, LLC
5 Saunders & Walker, PA
5 Seeger Salvas LLP
*Number includes firms with one attorney appointed to all four coordinated Pelvic Repair Systems
Products Liability Litigations before Judge Goodwin. Coding these four cases as one would cause
those firms with seven or fewer appointments to be excluded from this list.
**Number includes firms with two attorneys appointed to all four coordinated Pelvic Repair Systems
Products Liability Litigations before Judge Goodwin. Coding these four cases as one would cause
those firms with eleven or fewer appointments to be excluded from this list.
